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The policy process of any government agency involves many
participants representing diverse interests. The participants
involved in the national park policy process have not only caused
many changes in park policy through the years, but have also
caused an evolution in the philosophical basis upon which that
policy is founded. The anthropocentric philosophy, which places
primary emphasis on providing recreation, dominated national park
management after World War II, but because of public pressure on
the National Park Service, seems to have given way to the
biocentric philosophy, which places primary emphasis on preserving
naturally occurring environmental processes.
This study first reviews the history of the national parks with
the objective of tracing the evolution of park policy and the
changes in its philosophical basis. The study then examines as a
case study a specific visitor facilities development, Grant
Village, in Yellowstone National Park which has been under
construction through the time of the major shift in National Park
Service philosophy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism.
The development has been controversial for several reasons; one
of the most important is that it is seen by many people to be an
outdated response to increasing visitation because it provides
convenience-oriented facilities characteristic of the
anthropocentric era of management. The Park Service, on the other
hand, insists that completion of the project will accomplish the
biocentric goals of replacing other facilities in fragile thermal
areas and grizzly bear habitat. Critics of the development,
however, argue that the tradeoff is an unfavorable one with
questionable ecological benefits.
Biocentrism seems to be the appropriate basis for future park
policy because it recognizes the importance of preserving complex
ecological processes to the recreational visitor's experience.
Examination of Grant Village within the context of this philosophy
indicates that the Park Service needs to openly adopt biocentrism
as its basis for policy. Once that is done the agency must choose
the clientele it will seek to serve. In order for the choice to
be effective, the parks need Congress to strengthen the laws under
which the Service operates.
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CHAPTER ONE:
EXPLANATION OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION
For any agency of the federal government the formation and
implementation of policy is a complex process involving many
participants from both within and outside the government. These
participants can be constituency groups, public interest groups, forces
within the involved agency, other governmental agencies, Congress, the
president and his cabinet, the judicial branch, and even state
governments. Frequently their effects on policy are not easily
discernable in the process; motives and actions are often unclear,
unspecified, or consciously concealed. These participants can
facilitate, hinder, or even block the formation and implementation of an
agency's policy.
Federal land management agencies in particular experience a wide
variety of participants in their policy process. These agencies manage
millions of acres, primarily in the western states and Alaska. The USDA
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the US Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service (NPS) are the major
federal land managers. Decisions made by them concerning industrial and
agricultural uses of the land (timber, grazing, mining), as well as
recreational uses (boating, hunting, hiking, tourism), can have
tremendous local and regional economic impacts. For this reason diverse
groups work to influence policy decisions in favor of their particular
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interests.
These agencies are often mandated by law to manage the lands for a
wide variety of uses that are frequently seen as conflicting by user
groups. For example, the Forest Service is instructed by the Multiple
Use- Sustained Yield Act (16 U.S.C. 528-531) to manage each national
forest equally for wildlife, livestock grazing, recreation, timber
production, and watershed proctection. The BLM manages primarily for
grazing, mining, and recreation. Additionally, both agencies, as well
as the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service, are mandated by
the Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 1131-1136) to manage legally
designated wilderness within lands under their respective jurisdictions.
This multiple use management presents inherent user conflicts.
Perhaps one federal land management agency more than any other is
faced with dealing with a wide assortment of participants in its policy
process. The National Park Service is charged with the responsibility
of managing national parks, monuments, recreation areas, historic sites,
national capital parks, parkways, seashores and lakeshores, scenic
riverways, historic landmarks, and one park for the performing arts
(Lee, 1974). The diversity of lands under its control requires the NPS
to operate under a wide-ranging set of management policies that critics
say cloud the original purpose of each type of unit in the system.
Also, lands managed by the NPS are the most visible of all federal
lands. They are located in almost every state, frequently in or near
major cities, and by 1982 recreational visits to these areas had reached
245 million per year (USDI, 1983).
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Of the lands managed by the NPS, the national parks arguably have
the largest and most vocal group of participants in their decision
making process (For the purposes of this study, the term "national
parks" will refer to those units in the national park system officially
called national parks, as well as national monuments which contain large
segments of pristine backcountry). One reason for this intensity and
diversity of participants is that the parks are the oldest type of unit
in the system, and through the years have become the best known. Parks
such as Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Grand Canyon are known worldwide
and are often referred to as the "crown jewels" of America; because of
their popularity, people from around the world share an interest in
their management. Another reason is that the parks have been
established individually through the years since 1872, each with its own
organic act. Frequently, provisions in some of these acts allow uses in
a particular park (such as grazing, hunting, or mining) that are
generally contrary to NPS policy. A third reason is that several of the
parks were established before the Park Service was created, and
therefore policy development in those parks was originally
uncoordinated; often practices begun in that era continue to exist in
those parks in spite of contradictory NPS policy. A fourth reason is
that the NPS, when created, was given an ambiguous mandate by Congress
(the National Park Service Act of 1916; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) to
provide for use of the parks as well as to preserve them.
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All these reasons contribute to very active interactions in the
national park policy process, but perhaps the center of all park
disputes is the vague mandate of the National Park Service Act. The
meaning of the Act is subject to a wide range of interpretations, and
Hendee et al. (1978) assert that "[t]he ambiquity inherent in the
National Park Service Act has been a source of extensive commentary and
still more extensive agony for subsequent park managers". Indeed, the
mandate to preserve the parklands while at the same time providing for
their use by the public forces NPS managers to strike a balance between
the two seemingly diametrically opposed goals, and an argument can be
made that practically all problems in national park management revolve
around the "preservation versus use" issue, as the mandate has come to
be called. Since any use by the public will impair a natural
environment to some extent, complete preservation is impossible.
Therefore, the question NPS administrators face is one of degrees: How
much change in the natural resources of the parks will be tolerated in
order to allow the public to make use of the parks? The logical
follow-up to that question is: What levels and types of use can be
allowed which will provide the visitor the experiences he desires from a
national park and yet still afford the preservation of the essential
aspects which made the park worthy of establishment?
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THE CHOICE OF A MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
The philosophical approach through which to achieve those dual
goals has been left to the discretion of the agency. Hendee et al.
(1978) propose and define two primary philosophical approaches to
wilderness management, both of which can be expanded to apply to
national park management. According to them, one is anthropocentrism,
the other is biocentrism. The anthropocentric approach takes the
"benefit and enjoyment of the people" phrase from the Yellowstone Act
(16 U.S.C. 21-22), the "promote and regulate use" phrase of the
National Park Service Act, and the "use and enjoyment" phrase of the
Wilderness Act literally. Increasing the public's direct use and thus
increasing human values and benefits is the primary concern of managers
choosing this approach; sociological considerations and cultural
definitions take precedence over biological concepts (Hendee and
Stankey, 1973). Convenience-oriented styles of recreation are
facilitated, and "[b]ecause the production of recreational experiences
is a primary goal, actions to increase access, to reduce difficulty and
danger, and to facilitate use would be encouraged" (Hendee et al.,
1978). Those environmental conditions most pleasing to the majority of
users are aided by managerial actions.
On the other hand, Hendee et al. (1978) define the biocentric
approach as one which "places primary emphasis on preservation of the
natural order", and where "recreational use is secondary to maintenance
of the natural order". Managers favoring this approach allow naturally
evolving environmental processes (erosion, fire, etc.) to proceed to the
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maximum extent possible. Because of the values, including recreational
and scientific, placed on the preservation of those processes, certain
benefits will then accrue to society (Hendee and Stankey, 1973).
Control of visitor behavior in order to protect the naturalness of the
area is emphasized rather than control of environmental conditions.
The primary difference between the two approaches is the "extent to
which...[human] benefits are viewed as being dependent on the
naturalness" of the managed area (Hendee et al., 1978). The
anthropocentric approach asserts that naturalness is of little
importance to the visitor's experience, and therefore permits
manipulation of the environment to meet visitor demands and thus provide
benefits; the biocentric approach advocates manipulation of visitor
behavior in order to preserve natural conditions which lead to desired
benefits. Hence, both approaches seek to provide similar benefits
through the use of different management actions.
As Hendee et al. (1978) point out, purely anthropocentric and
purely biocentric philosophies are at opposite ends of a continuum of
management orientations. Interest groups at both ends of the continuum
work to influence policy, and Nash (1982) called the debate between the
two opposing philosophical viewpoints "[o]ne of the most sensitive
issues in wilderness management". Actual policies for a park or
wilderness may be a compromise between the two philosophies and
therefore be a combination of them which lies somewhere along the
continuum between the two polar extremes. The use of these
terms—anthropocentrism and biocentrism—with respect to resource

Page 7

management was begun only recently. Historically, the choice of a
philosophical approach to land management has been unarticulated and can
only be inferred by studying statements and policies issued during the
time period in question. Thus, determining the exact point at which a
particular policy lies on the continuum is an arbitrary decision, and it
is therefore more useful to point out relative differences in the
philosophical orientation of policies in question.
Aspects of both philosophies abound in national park management.
Park managers may utilize biocentric manipulations such as restricting
or limiting backcountry use, eliminating exotic species, and allowing
natural fluctuations in wildlife populations, while in the same park
such anthropocentric policies as fire suppression and encouragement of
convenience-oriented camping and lodging may be advocated. Frequently
the degree to which either an anthropocentric or biocentric approach is
utilized varies from park to park, depending upon each park's particular
traditions, history, administration, and political environment. The
political environment is particularly important because each park has
its own unique set of political forces which exert a substantial amount
of pressure on that park's policy process in order to push policies
toward the philosophical approach they favor.
A HISTORICAL REVIEW
The first part of this study will examine the history of national
park policy within the context of the management philosophy continuum,
and will identify relative changes in the philosophical orientation of

Page 8

policy as it evolved through the years. The participants who were most
responsible for the shifts in philosophy will also be identified, and
their roles in affecting those shifts will be examined. This review
will be done in order to build a basis of understanding for closer
examination of a case study of national park policy.
THE CASE STUDY
Following the historical review, the study will examine a
particular visitor facilities development in a major national park as a
case study of the forces at work in the park level policy process.
According to Gilbert (1971), "The case study approach to analysis and
learning is widely acclaimed by educators. Reading about an actual
event and the chronological happenings that took place gives the
student...an insight into the planning, or lack of it, and the results
that followed".
The Grant Village project in Yellowstone National Park will be used
as the case study. It is a very controversial visitor facilities
development that was first conceived in the 1930s, and construction
which was begun in the 1950s is not yet completed today. Grant Village
is a major development that includes a campground, visitor center, gas
station, marina, and 700 units of lodging (planned); plus roads,
parking lots, sewer and water systems, employee housing, and other
necessary support facilities. Throughout its history problems have
arisen, including concessioner financial difficulties, which could have
terminated the project had the Park Service been less committed to it.

Page 9

Moreover, several policy changes have occurred in the past twenty years
which reflect changes in NPS philosophy since the time Grant Village was
begun. The decision making process as used at Grant Village will be
expanded upon to determine what conclusions can be drawn about
participants involved in the National Park Service policy process in
general, and their effects on the results of that process. The focal
point of this study will be a comparison of national park policy as
stated at the national level, and policies and management actions at the
park level. Apparent discrepancies that occur will be examined to
determine if they actually exist, and if they do, why they occurred.
Grant Village will be used because it is controversial; several
participants have been involved in the decisions made over the past
twenty-five years. It is a major development located in the oldest and
probably best known national park, and thus it would be expected to
attract a larger number and broader range of interested participants
from outside the government than would a smaller development in a lesser
known park. In addition, more participants from within the government
would be expected to be involved because of the importance of decisions
made in the world's first national park. Another reason for using Grant
Village is that the original concept of the project arose almost fifty
years ago in a different era of park management, and it has slowly been
developed over the years with only relatively minor changes. It was
planned during a period of relatively extreme anthropocentrism in park
policy, but is being constructed during a time when a more biocentric
philosophy has been adopted, at least by implication, by the National
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Park Service; thus, at several points throughout its history decisions
must have been made that dealt with changes in NPS policy as they
related to Grant Village.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This study is particularly concerned with the participants in the
national park policy process and the methods they use to influence the
process. Ogden (1971) stated that public policy is made within power
clusters made up of the various participants, or actors, and a
particular type of policy, such as resource policy (including national
parks), has its own power cluster. He described those power clusters:
Public policy in the American political system is made
within power clusters which operate with remarkable
independence from one another within the common constitutional
and political party structure. Each power cluster consists of
administrative agencies, executive review staff, legislative
committees, interest groups, influential private citizens, and
attentive publics who center their public policy concerns and
activity primarily in one broad policy area. Most power
clusters operate at all levels of government.
In order to examine the actors within the national park power
cluster and to determine the effects of individual actors or groups of
actors on the national park policy process, a conceptual framework, or
model, is needed to facilitate understanding of how the process
functions. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) provide a simple framework for
the policy process which is well-suited for this analysis. In this
model, there are three environments in the policy process: policy
formation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. Within these
environments are any number of actors who operate within various arenas
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to affect policy. Communication linkages occur between different actors
in the three environments and serve to tie the system together. (Fig.
1)
linkages

ENVIRONMENT I:
Policy Formation
(actors and arenas)

ENVIRONMENT II:
Policy Implementation
(actors and arenas)

linkages

linkages
ENVIRONMENT III:
Policy Evaluation
(actors and arenas)

Fig. 1. The policy process (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980).

The advantages of this model are that it is cyclical, fluid
(actors operating in one environment can also act in others), and open
(policies can originate within or outside the system). The "classical"
policy implementation model was hierarchical, with policy formulators
directing policy to policy implementers who carry out instructions,
creating policy outputs (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). Being cyclical
makes the model more powerful because policy formation and
implementation are continuing processes. This model also lacks the
rigidity of the old model; the linkages between environments can go both
ways between any two environments, rather than one way down through the
system.
Further explanation of the principal components of this framework
is necessary. These explanations are paraphrased from Nakamura and
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Smallwood.
ENVIRONMENT 1^ Policy Formulation. This environment consists
primarily of formal policy makers—government officials who create
policy. These actors operate within the governmental arena and are
influenced by special interest groups and other constituency groups
from outside arenas who push for policy decisions favorable to their
respective causes. Clarity, or lack of it, in the policy messages
passed from the policy makers is a major factor in the implementation
and evaluation of the policy.
ENVIRONMENT II: Policy Implementation. Within this environment
many different actors, operating out of many diverse arenas, work to
facilitate, hinder, or block the implementation of policy directives
sent from the formal policy makers. Policy makers from Environment I,
lobbyists, consumers, the media, among others, as well as formal
implementers within the government, are involved. Diversity, fluidity,
and complexity in terms of actors, arenas, and linkages are
characteristic of this environment; formal implementers must coordinate
this environment, often using only ambiguous policy directives. As a
result, the policy implementation environment is very political.
ENVIRONMENT III: Policy Evaluation. The evaluation of policy
can be done by the policy makers or the policy implementers, but more
objective evaluation can best be carried out by professionals who
evaluate on technical bases. These technical evaluators are limited
because they have no political constituency of their own; they must
rely on the power and influence of others. Also, evaluation is not
totally objective nor an alternative to political judgments because
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it is "ultimately controlled by policy makers and policy implementers".
Linkages. The linkages are the communications bridges between
policy makers and policy implementers, as well as evaluators; they are
also between those actors within government and actors outside
government. Linkages between policy makers and implementers are
especially important. Breakdowns can occur when messages are garbled
by the senders or misinterpreted (intentionally or unintentionally) by
receivers, when "overload" occurs (many conflicting messages are
received), or when "follow-up and compliance mechanisms" fail to ensure
that messages have been accurately received and carried out.
SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to examine park policy first in a
historical context in order to trace the evolution of its philosophical
orientation, then within the context of a particular case study, in
order to draw conclusions about differences that occur between stated
policy at the national level and policies and management actions at the
park level.
The overall objectives of this study are:
1) to provide an understanding of the historical changes in
national park management philosophy and the actors involved in the
policy process who were most influential in causing those changes,

Page 14

2) to identify the major actors involved in the Grant Village
project throughout its history in order to discover who influences
decisions made at the park level,
3) to draw conclusions about the philosophy behind broadly
stated policy at the national level and the effects of various
actors on policy at the park level, and to theorize about the
implications these conclusions may have for national park
management.
The thesis of this study is that within the set of actors, or
power cluster, which works to influence park policy a subset of
actors at the park level effectively works to influence that
particular park's policy, and frequently prevents those policies
from following the course of park policy at the national level.
Therefore, emphasis will be placed on the actors involved in the
process and the methods they employ to affect the decisions
resulting from the process, as well as their reasons for
involvement in the process. A simple, cyclical model will be used
to facilitate understanding of the the policy process. The actors
and the arenas within which the actors operate will be identified,
as will the policy environments (formation, implementation, and
evaluation) the actors work to affect.
In order to achieve an overall understanding of how national
park policy is made, the evolution of national park policy will be
reviewed, identifying the actors involved, and the relative changes
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in management philosophy between anthropocentrism and biocentrism
will be placed within a historical context. The study will then
focus on a controversial visitor facilities development in
Yellowstone National Park and the actors involved in the decision
making process who have helped perpetuate the project in spite of
various problems and objections. Conclusions will then be drawn as
to the sets of actors involved at the national level as well as the
park level and their effects on policies resulting from the
process.

CHAPTER TWO:
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PARK POLICY

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the following historical review is to provide a
basis for understanding the development of national park policy,
particularly in the areas of concessions and visitor facilities,
and to show shifts in policy between biocentric and anthropocentric
management philosophies. Emphasis will be placed on the actors
involved in the evolution of park policy from the beginning of the
national park idea in the early nineteenth century to the present.
THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL PARK IDEA
The establishment of Yellowstone National Park by Congress in
1872 is often referred to as the beginning of the national park
idea, but the origins of the idea actually came from a variety of
influential people over several years prior to the passage of the
Yellowstone Act. The most important actors in the early years of
the national park concept were the writers and artists of the
nineteenth century who went against the accepted view of wilderness
as a place to be feared and conquered, and instead depicted the
American frontier as something beautiful and unique. Their reasons
for believing in the preservation of wild country were varied, but
were generally based in biocentric philosophy.
16
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George Cat!in was an artist who became famous for his
paintings of American Indians. In 1832 he foresaw the decline of
the Indian and buffalo on the Great Plains and wrote:
And what a splendid contemplation too, when one (who has
travelled these realms, and can duly appreciate them) imagines
them as they might in future be seen (by some great protecting
policy of government) preserved in their pristine beauty and
wildness...A nation's Park, containing man and beast, in all
the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty!" (Catlin,
1880)

Thus, although Catlin envisioned national parks as huge tracts of
wilderness set aside so Indians and wildlife could live as they had
before white man came to the continent, he is generally recognized as
the first to specifically call for a national park.
Henry David Thoreau was a writer and leader of the
Transcendental!st movement, whose members believed that a realm of
spiritual truths exist on a higher plain than physical truths, and that
wilderness offered the best environment for seeking these spiritual
truths (Nash, 1973). They thus advocated the preservation of wilderness
because wilderness would in turn help preserve civilized man. In
Thoreau's words, "in Wildness is the preservation of the World"
(Nash,1973).
In 1858 Thoreau suggested "national preserves, in which the bear,
and the panther, and some even of the hunter race may still exist, and
not be civilized off the face of the earth—not for idle sport or food,
but for inspiration and our own true recreation" (Udall, 1963).
Thoreau's vision was thus much like Catlin's, only he cited recreation
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as a purpose for the preserves.
Other writers (William Cullen Bryant, James Fenimore Cooper, and
Ralph Waldo Emerson) and artists (John James Audubon, Thomas Cole, and
Albert Bierstadt) helped advance the positive image of wilderness
through their works during the early and mid-1800's. But it was an age
when the prevalent philosophy was one of "manifest destiny", the belief
that the possession and settlement of the western frontier by Americans
was a Christian duty. Also, the "Myth of Superabundance" (Udall, 1963)
was prevalent; Americans believed the Western frontier to be so vast
and its resources so abundant that man could never use it all up. Thus,
wilderness advocates did not reflect the feelings of the majority of
Americans. Instead, they offered a minority opinion, and while they
sought wilderness preservation for a variety of reasons and influenced a
relatively small number of Americans, they did provide the spark for the
national park idea.
One of the most important actors in the gradual changing of
America's environmental philosophy was George Perkins Marsh. In 1864
Marsh wrote an influential book about man's treatment of nature in which
he recognized the complexity of ecological interactions, and wrote that
man's actions can have important, and sometimes devastating, effects on
the environment; therefore man should recognize and understand the
potential consequences of his actions before he acts. He put wilderness
preservation in practical terms; it was useful to protect watersheds
and regulate stream flows, as well as to provide recreational
opportunities and wildlife habitat (Nash, 1973). Marsh's reasons for
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preserving wildlands were anthropocentric, rather than biocentric; his
argument thus made wilderness protection more compatible with progress
and economic gain (Nash, 1973), and therefore gained wider acceptance
for the idea.
In the same year that Marsh's book was published, 1864, Yosemite
Valley was ceded by Congress to the state of California. At the time,
grants to states were not unusual, but the reasons for this particular
one were important. The valley was to be set aside for "public use,
resort and recreation", and this use was to be "inalienable for all
time" (June 30, 1864, c. 184, sees. 1,2,13 Stat. 325). The primary
actors in getting the valley reserved were a small group of Californians
concerned about private abuse of the area. They convinced their US
senator to sponsor protective legislation (Runte, 1979). In that same
year Albert Bierstadt's paintings of the Rocky Mountains and Yosemite
Valley had gained him a great deal of fame, and probably helped
popularize the idea of protection for the Valley. Most likely, however,
the "driving force" of the Yosemite Valley preservation movement was
Frederick Law Olmsted (Huth, 1957), who was subsequently appointed the
first chairman of the board of commissioners established to manage the
new Yosemite Park (Sax, 1980). Olmsted, a premier landscape architect
of his day, believed in the preservation of outstanding scenery because,
in his words, it had a favorable influence on the "health and vigor of
men" (Nash, 1973). He wrote a report which presented philosophic
reasons for the establishment of state and national parks; the primary
reason being that outstanding scenery provides stimulus for man to
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disengage his thoughts from daily tasks, and to engage them instead in
contemplation (Sax, 1980). Olmsted believed that activities in parks
should center around, and be dependent upon, the scenery the park was
established to preserve; those activities not dependent upon the unique
scenery, or which interfered with contempletive activities, should not
be encouraged (Sax, 1980). Olmsted thus believed in preserving
wildlands for primarily biocentric reasons, and many of his ideas are
still considered important principles of recreation management today.
It is important to recognize that in spite of Olmsted's
biocentrism, Yosemite Valley was not set aside to preserve pristine
wilderness in response to the writings of wilderness advocates, but
rather to protect outstanding scenery for the purpose of providing
public recreation. Many Americans in the nineteenth century felt
culturally inferior to Europeans because of the lack of cultural
monuments in America (Runte, 1979). Thus, when writers and artists who
travelled the West described giant waterfalls and beautiful valleys
surrounded by majestic mountains, they often compared them to Europe's
man-made monuments. Runte (1979) uses the term "monumentalism" to
describe this substitution of natural monuments for man-made monuments
as cultural symbols, and suggests that it was the underlying reason for
the establishment of Yosemite Park. Runte's monumentalism is
fundamentally an anthropocentric concept because it asserts that the
naturalness of an area was second in importance to its spectacular
scenery. The style of tourism in that time period supports his theory.
Fine accommodations and easy access to the points of interest were
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considered essential to the tourists of that era because they preferred
to view outstanding scenery from the comfort of their luxury hotel.
This style of tourism has come to be called the "portal syndrome"
(Hendee et al., 1978).
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK
In 1870 an expedition consisting primarily of prominent Montanans
and an army escort explored the region known today as Yellowstone
National Park. Fantastic stories of the natural features of the area
had been circulating since the days of the mountain men. However, after
the members of the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition saw the geysers
and hot springs for themselves, they decided "that there ought to be no
private ownership of any portion of that region, but that the whole of
it ought to be set aside as a great National Park" (Langford, 1905).
Several of the members went on to lobby for the establishment of
Yellowstone National Park and although they did not originate the
national park idea, they are often given credit for it because, unlike
the Yosemite Grant, Yellowstone was kept under federal control (Runte,
1979). The Yellowstone region was located in a territory rather than in
a state, and thus had to be retained by the federal government (Udall,
1963). Eventually, Yosemite Valley was re-ceded to the federal
government to become part of Yosemite National Park.
One year after the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition, the Hayden
expedition went into the region to survey it and to gain scientific
information about it. Included in that group were a landscape artist,
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Thomas Moran, and a photographer, William Henry Jackson (Nash, 1973).
Upon the expedition's return, a movement to create Yellowstone National
Park began. The most prominent actors in this movement were members of
the two expeditions. Hayden and Langford actively lobbied for the Park;
both wrote articles about the unique features of the region in
Scribner's Monthly which generated much public interest (Huth, 1957).
Also, Moran's paintings of the geysers, waterfalls, and Yellowstone
Lake, as well as Jackson's photographs of the area, were effectively
used to convince congressmen of its uniqueness (Runte, 1979).
Therefore, the movement to establish Yellowstone Park was similar to the
wilderness preservation movement and the Yosemite Valley movement
because artists and writers were used to influence the public and
members of Congress.
However, the most important actor in the creation of Yellowstone
Park was undoubtedly Jay Cooke's Northern Pacific Railroad, which may
have actually suggested the park bill (Runte, 1979). In 1871 the
railroad sponsored lectures given by Langford in the East Cooke financed
Moran on the Hayden expedition, and an agent of the railroad officially
asked Hayden to lobby for the park proposal (Runte, 1979). The reason
for the railroad's interest in the Park was clear: It saw Yellowstone
as a "national vacation mecca" from which they would profit as the only
transportation line to the area (Nash, 1973).
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Congress passed the Yellowstone Act in 1872, and just as with the
Yosemite Grant, the reason for its passage was not wilderness
protection, but perhaps monumental1sm as Runte (1979) has suggested.
The "portal" experience of viewing the area from the safety and comfort
of civilization was again to be provided. When Langford saw Yellowstone
Lake for the first time in 1870, he clearly did not foresee the area
preserved in its pristine state:
It is dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by
man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with villas
and the ornaments of civilized life...It possesses
adaptabilities for the highest display of artificial culture,
amid the greatest wonders of Nature that the world affords,
and is beautified by the grandeur of the most extensive
mountain scenery, and not many years can elapse before the
march of civil improvement will reclaim this delightful
solitude, and garnish it with all the attractions of
cultivated taste and refinement. (Langford, 1905)
While Langford may have refined his prediction for the Lake after his
initial excitement, he definitely favored some form of public use, as
his diary states: "I do not know of any portion of our country where a
national park can be established furnishing to visitors more wonderful
attractions than here" (Langford, 1905). Langford's comments reflect
the general anthropocentrism that pervaded in his day. Undoubtedly he
also reflected the Northern Pacific railroad's attitude as well.
Also, passage of the bill was not due to a strong feeling of
support in Congress, but rather to the lack of opposition. Some members
had reservations about the bill, but it passed for four primary reasons:
First, although the amount of land to be set aside was huge, its size
had nothing to do with protecting complete ecosystems or preserving
wilderness; it was intended to be that extensive only to protect as yet
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undiscovered geysers, hot pools, and other outstanding natural features
(Runte, 1979). Second, as in the case of almost every succeeding
national park establishment bill, the Yellowstone region was presented
by park supporters as economically worthless (Runte, 1979). This
argument was necessary to appease actors from mining, ranching, and
lumber interests so they would not use their considerable influence in
Congress to block the bill. Third, the area was largely inaccessible,
and the Myth of Superabundance probably prevented some members of
Congress from being concerned about such a remote and economically
insignificant area. However, Congress did reserve the right to dissolve
the Park should economic interests demand it. Runte (1979) quoted
Representative Dawes, who stated at the time of the debate over the
bill:
This bill reserves control over [Yellowstone] and preserves
the control over it to the United States, so that at any time
when it shall appear that it will be better to devote it to
any other purpose it will be perfectly within the control of
the United States to do it.
Fourth, supporters believed the Park would be self-supporting, which
eliminated opposition from members of Congress concerned about the cost
of the Park to taxpayers. This belief is further evidence of the
anthropocentrism behind the park's establishment, because only by
providing the luxury accommodations demanded by the "portal" tourists
could the Park be expected to generate adequate income.
In the Yellowstone Act, just as in the Yosemite Grant, Congress did
not state its intentions regarding management policies for the Park, or
the type of recreational opportunities to be provided for visitors (Sax,
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1976). The Act stated that the area was to be "set apart as a public
park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people",
and that the Secretary of the Interior "shall provide for the
preservation, from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits,
natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in
their natural condition", and "provide against the wanton destruction of
the fish and game found within said park". Exactly how the Park was to
be used for the "benefit and enjoyment of the people" was not specified,
and the bill provided no funding, staff, or penalties for violating
protective provisions of the law. However, the bill did include a
provision for the Secretary to grant leases for "small parcels of
ground, at such places in said park as shall require the erection of
buildings for the accommodation of visitors". Congress thus recognized
the anthropocentric support for the Act and considered concessions
within the Park appropriate. Lobbying by the Northern Pacific Railroad
was probably at least partially responsible for this provision being in
the bill; railroad officials recognized the necessity of having
comfortable accommodations in the park to draw tourists.
For the first ten years of the Park's existence, however, the area
was very remote and largely inaccessible; visitation was confined
primarily to wealthy Easterners and settlers from surroundings areas.
Langford was appointed the first superintendent, and immediately
implemented a policy of denying virtually all applications from private
interests desiring to construct and operate toll roads, hotels, and
stores in the Park (Bartlett, 1983). Most likely he was waiting for the
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Northern Pacific to lay tracks to the area and place their own
concessions application (Haines, 1977). Some small concessioners
claiming to have been in the area prior to 1872 were allowed to continue
operating their crude concessions (Bartlett, 1983). These operations
consisted primarily of a log shack "hotel" and small bathhouses at
Mammoth Hot Springs (Haines, 1977).
Not until 1877 did the Secretary of the Interior establish rules
prohibiting commercial hunting, fishing, and trapping, and not until a
year later did Congress provide any management funds for the Park (Ise,
1961). The second Yellowstone superintendent, Philetus Norris, used
some of those funds to construct the first crude road system, which was
designed to take visitors to the prominent features of the park:
Mammoth Hot Springs, the Upper Geyser Basin, the Grand Canyon of the
Yellowstone River, and the outlet of the River at Yellowstone Lake
(Haines, 1977). The road system that exits in the Park today
essentially follows Norris' original layout, and it is important to
recognize that it was designed to provide tourist access to the natural
features preserved within the Park, in keeping with the anthropocentric
desires of the "portal" tourist.
By 1882 Norris' road system was fairly extensive; the Northern
Pacific had extended its tracks to Livingston, Montana, sixty miles
north of the Park, and had begun to publicize the Park as a vacation
"Wonderland" in order to entice travellers to ride their line (Bartlett,
1983). Norris favored the licensing of guides and the development of
concessions and, unlike his predecessor, he opposed the railroad's
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efforts to gain monopolistic control of Park concessions. This
opposition indirectly led to his removal from the superintendency when a
group of Montanans whose town would have benefited from a Northern
Pacific line into the Park objected to Norris' policies and gained the
support of railroad allies in Congress (Haines, 1977). The railroad was
thus once again was an important actor in the formation of national park
policy. However, Congress as a whole favored competition in the Park;
one senator went so far as to state, "All who desire to operate
concessions of any kind in Yellowstone National Park should be permitted
to do so" (Everhart, 1972). Nevertheless, the railroad had powerful
allies and Norris' replacement was a man much more sympathetic to its
interests (Haines, 1977). Also, the Secretary of the Interior
anticipated substantial numbers of tourists since the area had become
accessible, and realized that they would be expecting resort hotels to
accommodate them (Bartlett, 1983). He believed a monopolized
concessioner would be best able to build those facilities quickly, and
granted the concessions contract to a group of investors with Northern
Pacific connections. In 1882 a monopoly entered the Park, and from 1892
until 1967 the primary hotel and transportation concessions were
operated by the same company managed by two men and their descendents
(Bartlett, 1983). However, Bartlett states that this arrangement came
about because of pressure and politics, not planning or past policy.

It

is clear that from the initial movement to establish Yellowstone
National Park through the early stages of policy formation, the railroad
interests were the leading actors in the process. They were able to
exert substantial pressure because of the expansionist desires of a
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public who wanted more access to the West, and because the vague intent
of the Yellowstone Act allowed a wide range of interpretations.
Furthermore, the anthropocentric orientation of the park movement and
early park policy was due to a significant extent to the railroad's
influence and its desire to serve the "portal" tourist.
The Park did not have an adequate staff to enforce the protective
rules established by the Secretary. Squatters, poachers, and vandals
became so numerous, the wildlife so decimated, and the mineral
formations around the thermal features so scarred, that in 1886 the
Department of the Interior requested the Secretary of War to send a
troop of cavalry to take over the administration and protection of the
Park (Hampton, 1971). The request came about partly as a result of
criticism of Park administration by a member of Congress and the editor
of the Chicago Tribune, who were heavily fined by corrupt officials of
the Park while on a visit there; at the time Congress had grown
discontented with the Park's management and had considered repeal of the
Yellowstone Act, turning the Park over to Wyoming territory, or ending
civilian administration of the Park (Haines, 1977). Had either of the
first two options been chosen the national park movement would most
likely have come to an early end. Once again, the primary actors in
policy formation (in this case military administration) were prominent
people who enjoyed influence in Congress.
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The army took over the administration of the Park in 1886, and in
spite of there being no "well-defined policy of protection", no
"judicial machinery" for the prosecution of violators, and no training
for the soldiers in how to protect the Park, it managed Yellowstone and
other national parks as they were established and is credited with
saving the early national system (Hampton, 1971).
Not until 1894, with the passage of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C.S.
24,26,30,30a), did the Army receive the judicial machinery to prosecute
and punish law breakers; prior to passage of the Act soldiers used
extralegal means of punishment, such as temporary and unauthorized
incarceration (Hampton, 1971). The Act established penalties for
killing or injuring wildlife, removing timber, and damaging thermal
features; it also set up a legal system for the prosecution of
violators under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government.
According to Hampton (1971), several similar bills failed to pass
because railroad proponents in Congress always added amendments which
granted rights-of-way through the Park to the Northern Pacific. Park
proponents would then remove their support from the bill. The Lacey Act
passed because George Bird Grinnell, editor of Field and Stream, wrote
several editorials about poaching and vandalism in the Park, and also
because citizens of Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah signed petitions protesting
a railroad right-of-way. Although visitation was still quite low, a
little over 5300 in 1895 (Hampton, 1971), the public knew of the Park
largely through stories in books and magazines, and through railroad
advertisements. Thus, public involvement was becoming a major factor in
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the Park policy process. The railroad lobby was still very powerful,
and determined to gain as much control of Yellowstone as it could get.
Also, in 1890 Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant (now part of
Sequoia-Kings Canyon) were set aside, largely through the efforts of the
Southern Pacific Railroad; in later years other railroads helped get
Glacier (Great Northern Railway), Grand Canyon (Santa Fe Railroad), and
other parks established (Runte, 1974). The railroads were obviously a
very formidable lobby. One park proponent in the Senate described the
railroad lobby as "exactly like a compact military organization working
for one object alone. They are persistent, aggressive, sleepless,
untiring, and they are determined..." (Hampton, 1971). The national
park movement and the railroads thus entered into a "pragmatic
alliance"; railroad lobbying helped create parks, their advertisements
helped increase visitation and boost public support of the parks but
their motives were purely selfish and therefore park proponents were
wary of them (Runte, 1974).
POLICY FORMATION DURING MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
During civilian administration, the superintendent of Yellowstone
was responsible for most of the policy formation. Congress had no clear
idea of what was to be done with the Park they had created, and in the
early years after it was established, showed little interest in Park
matters because the public had not yet become interested; therefore the
superintendent had a free hand in making and implementing policy (within
budgetary constraints), until his actions came in conflict with an
influential actor in the process, most often the railroad. Norris
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designed and constructed roads as he wanted them (Haines, 1977);
established policies forbidding the cutting of timber and removal of
mineral deposits, prohibiting hunting, trapping, and fishing (except to
provide food for visitors or residents), and forbidding the selling of
liquor or establishing a permanent residence within the Park (Hampton,
1971). He also worked to prevent the railroad from gaining control of
Park concessions (Haines, 1977). It was his railroad policy that led to
his removal. His successor was removed at least partly because he stood
in the way of a monopoly attempt by a railroad-backed concessioner
(Haines, 1977). Thus, policy evaluation in the early period of
Yellowstone Park history was indirectly carried out in a large measure
by the Northern Pacific Railroad.
When the Army took over administration of Yellowstone and the other
parks as they were established, the effect was to:
..remove the administration of the Park from the political
arena; and under the direction of energetic and conscientious
military officers the rules and regulations governing the Park
were revised and enforced, various threats to the very
existence of the Park were met and overcome, policy was
determined, a precedent was established for a national park
system, and punitive legislation was finally obtained from a
reluctant Congress. (Hampton, 1971)
Under the Army superintendents several policies were initiated or
continued from civilian superintendents: cutting timber, hunting,
trapping, discharging firearms, selling liquor, grazing stock, and
throwing objects into geysers and hot springs was prohibited; use of
campfires was restricted (Hampton, 1971). Also, the practices of fish
stocking in barren lakes, predator control, active forest fire
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suppression, and the building of backcountry patrol cabins were begun
(Hampton, 1971). Therefore, while army administration effectively
blunted the railroad's influence, several anthropocentric policies were
instituted which were meant to change the parks to suit the desires of
the visiting public.
During the 32 years of Army administration a national park "system"
was begun, but it was actually a very loose collection of independently
managed units. According to Ise (1961), "each park was officially a
separate unit, administratively different from the others". In the
first decade of the twentieth century a controversy arose which gave
evidence of the weakness of the park "system". The city of San
Francisco needed a source of water, and decided that Hetch Hetchy Valley
in Yosemite Park would be an excellent location for a dam to produce
hydroelectric power and to provide a reservoir for drinking water (Nash,
1973). Hetch Hetchy was "an aesthetic and geographical complement to
the Yosemite Valley" (Mantell, 1979), and park proponents vigorously
objected to the proposal.
The conservation of natural resources had become an accepted
concept by the turn of the twentieth century. The issue was no longer
"between a good (civilization) and an evil (wilderness) but between two
goods" (Nash, 1973). Conservation as described by Marsh in 1864 had
grown into a viable movement in American society, largely due to the
efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, lifelong
conservationist (Udall, 1963); but the Hetch Hetchy controversy served
to widen a split within the movement between the utilitarians and the
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preservationists. Utilitarians believed in the use of all resources for
commercial needs: timber, minerals, livestock. The use they advocated
was not the destructive and wasteful use practiced in the previous
century, but the "wise use" (Nash, 1973) Marsh had advocated, which
could be sustained over several generations with minimal damage to the
resource. Their concept of conservation was at the far anthropocentric
end of the management philosophy scale, and they believed that damming
the Valley was a proper use, and the most beneficial use.
Preservationists on the other hand believed, like Thoreau, that
civilized man could benefit from the preservation of outstanding scenery
and pristine wilderness. Their philosophy was strongly biocentric, and
they felt that the dam would needlessly destroy a wild area equal in
scenic beauty to Yosemite Valley.
The two most prominent actors in this controversy were Gifford
Pinchot and John Muir. Pinchot, Chief Forester of the USDA Forest
Service, was a "highly effective publicizer" for the utilitarian opinion
(Nash, 1973). He was a "magnificent bureaucrat" who worked closely with
Theodore Roosevelt to form a conservation policy that forced "the
American people to turn from flagrant waste of resources to programs of
wise stewardship" (Udall, 1963). Pinchot believed that "conservation
meant use rather than reservation from use" (Ise, 1961), and thus had no
interest in parks or wilderness preservation. He felt that a dam in
Hetch Hetchy Valley was a proper use of the resource which would benefit
the greatest number of people. Pinchot used his considerable influence
to work from within the federal government for the dam's construction.
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Muir, on the other hand, was a naturalist and founder of the Sierra Club
who believed in the Transcendentalist interpretation of wilderness
(Nash, 1973). He felt that "wilderness freedom, like political freedom,
was perennially in danger and could be maintained only by eternal
vigilance" (Udall, 1963). Like Pinchot, Muir was a friend of Roosevelt
and an effective publicizer;

but Muir worked from outside the

government to convince Roosevelt and the American public that Hetch
Hetchy should be preserved. He was known for his fiery oratory, and his
arguments against the dam took on religious overtones. He called dam
supporters "temple destroyers", and went further in stating: "Dam Hetch
Hetchy! As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and
churches; for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart
of man" (Ise, 1961). Muir's speeches, as well as magazine articles and
editorials of the day, helped make the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal a
national controversy.
In 1913, after a long and bitter political battle, Congress voted
to allow the construction of the dam. The controversy had several
important implications for the national park preservation movement.
First, because of the intense public support the battle had generated
for the parks, the movement had been shown to be a "viable political
force", but it was also "apparent that the very survival of the national
parks depended on the number of people who visited them" (Mantel 1,
1979). Also, rather than using the argument that parks were
economically worthless, preservationists realized that they needed to
stress the potential economic advantages of tourism to the parks, which
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meant they had to compromise some of their blocentrlsm. Third, the
controversy served to introduce the biocentric approach into national
park management, at least as a concept to be considered.
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
The Hetch Hetchy battle also served to point out the need for
unified management of the park "system". By 1915, the "system"
consisted of fourteen independently managed units (Sax, 1976), including
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Rainier, Crater Lake, and Glacier; each created
by separate acts of Congress, and all in the Interior Department. It
also included several national monuments, most established from the
public domain by presidential proclamation under broad interpretation of
the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.); these monuments
included Muir Woods, Mount Olympus, and the Grand Canyon. Some of these
were under the control of the Department of Agriculture, others were
under the War Department (Ise, 1961). Shankland (1951) described the
situation:
The concessioners operated under widely variant
regulations from park to park. The division of authority
among the parks, and even inside a single park, came close to
chaos. In Yellowstone all improvements and their
appropriations were managed by an officer of the Army Corps of
Engineers, who answered to neither the Interior Department nor
the park superintendent; the Superintendent was himself an
army officer, appointed by the Secretary of War; and
"exclusive control" rested with the Secretary of the Interior.
Other serious problems plagued the parks. Buchholtz (1969)
described two of the most serious:
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Congress formulated each of the national park organic
acts with a similarity of vague goals and imprecise wording
which, in time, contributed to administrative confusion during
their application or enforcement.
Most parks did not receive any appropriations from Congress
until several years after their formation, because of the
belief that they were to be self-supporting.
Ise (1961) described another, perhaps less evident, problem:
Some locality with an area of very modest scenic values, or
perhaps nothing at all, with an eye to Congressional
appropriations and profitable tourist traffic, might steam up
a campaign to have it made a national park, and if it had an
influential delegation in Congress might succeed in it.
In 1915, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, in an effort to
solve these problems brought Stephen Mather to Washington, D.C. to be
Assistant to the Secretary in charge of the parks. Mather was given the
responsibility of gaining Congressional support of the parks in order to
get increases in appropriations for the system, additions of appropriate
units to the system, and authorization of a bureau to manage the system;
he was also directed to organize this bureau once it was created,
develop facilities both within and around the parks, and increase public
use and support of the parks (Shankland, 1951).
Several influential people had been pushing in Washington for an
agency to manage the whole park system for several years before Mather
arrived there (Ise, 1961). However, along with the Hetch Hetchy
resolution, Mather's arrival in the capital was a major factor in
getting a managing agency created. Mather was a "[s]elf-made
millionaire, philanthropist, mountain climber" (Udall, 1963); he "was a
man of prodigious and explosive energy, a tireless worker, a born
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promoter" (Ise, 1961), "a disciple of John Muir" (Sax, 1976), and a
member of Muir's Sierra Club. He used his "business acumen and powers
of persuasion" (Udall, 1963) to publicize the parks in order to gain the
necessary support for the creation of an agency to manage them.
In 1916 the National Park Service Act was passed by Congress.
Mather worked closely with Horace Albright, a young lawyer in the
Interior Department, to organize the new Service as ordered by the Act
(Runte, 1979). Utilitarians in general, and the Forest Service in
particular, had opposed the bill; the Forest Service felt it could best
manage all federal lands, but preservationists saw the bill as "a
clear-cut blueprint of what the national parks stood for and how they
should be administered" (Runte, 1979). Control of all existing and
future national parks, plus the national monuments in the Department of
the Interior was granted to the new agency in the Act; the monuments in
the Departments of War and Agriculture remained there until 1933 (Lee,
1974). By 1918 the army was removed completely from the parks (Hampton,
1971), and Park Service rangers took over the soldiers' duties.
Rather than being a "clear-cut blueprint" for the parks, the Act
went no further than previous legislation in defining their proper use.
Instead it contained a mandate for the Service that has been at the
center of virtually every policy dispute since the Act was passed. The
Service was directed to "promote and regulate use" of the parks, while
at the same time it was also directed to "to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means
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as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations".
This "double mandate of preservation and use", as these statements have
come to be known, leaves the Service a great deal of discretion as to
what uses are to be considered appropriate in the national parks.
STEPHEN MATHER'S NATIONAL PARK POLICY
Mather was appointed the first director of the Service, and he
served in that position from 1917 until 1929, although his health broke
several times in that period from overwork. He died in 1930, after
being stricken in 1928 (Ise, 1961). Albright became Mather's close
friend, and served as his assistant and as superintendent of Yellowstone
from 1919 to 1929 (Haines, 1977), when he succeeded Mather as Director.
He served in that position until 1933 when he retired to enter private
business (Ise, 1961).
Together Mather and Albright worked to create a unified policy for
the national park system. Mather was undoubtedly the single most
important actor in the early formation of National Park Service policy.
Like Muir before him, he saw the need to cultivate support for the
parks, and devoted his energy and promotional skills toward convincing
"the leading eastern newspapers and magazines that the parks should be
sacrosanct. He carefully cultivated the members of Congress from the
park states, as well as those from other areas with committee
assignments important to the service" (Smith, 1966). He made every
effort to place the parks in the public consciousness. According to Ise
(1961), "[h]e courted senators and representatives and government
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dignitaries, writers...and newspaper owners and reporters". One of his
most effective ways of cultivating support was to take such influential
people on excursions through some of the parks (Ise, 1961). Mather
understood the importance of writers, as well as painters of national
park scenes (Ise, 1961), in influencing public attitudes of the parks;
he thus continued the practice that had been an important part of the
growth of public acceptance of the national park idea throughout its
history.
Mather also actively cultivated the support of the railroads, who
as had historically been true, were very willing to promote the parks.
Unable to foresee the coming impact of the automobile, they extensively
promoted park tourism (Ise, 1961), fully expecting to be the sole
beneficiaries of increased travel to the parks. Therefore, although
they did not enjoy the power they previously had, they remained
important actors in the park policy process.
Concessions were a major problem when Mather joined the Interior
Department in 1915. He felt the concessions system in general needed to
be "overhauled" (Ise, 1961). Yellowstone, for example, had the most
extensive concessions system of all the parks, but there was much
competition and overlapping of services. The primary hotel and
transportation systems established in 1892 had expanded to include a
chain of five hotels, two lunch stations, and a stagecoach line under
the auspices of two companies, both run by the same man; there were
also two other stagecoach lines, three permanent-camp systems, and a
"grab-bag of traveling camps" (Shankland, 1951). Mather saw this
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situation as wasteful and costly to visitors. He believed a regulated
monopoly would be more efficient and better able to provide quality
service at more reasonable prices. It took until 1924, but through
mergers, buy-outs, and coercion Mather succeeded in creating a monopoly
out of the concessions, excluding general stores and minor concessions
(Ise, 1961). Also, in 1915 he induced two of the stagecoach companies
to merge in order to establish a motor-bus service, which brought the
automobile to the Park (Shankland, 1951).
Some of Mather's promotional ideas would be considered quite
inappropriate in national parks today. He once wrote in reference to
Yellowstone:
Golf links, tennis courts, swimming pools, and other equipment
for outdoor pastime and exercise should be provided by
concessions, and the park should be extensively advertised as
a place to spend the summer instead of five or six days of
hurried sight-seeing under constant pressure to keep moving
... There is no national park better suited by nature for
spending leisurely vacations (Ise, 1961).
However, Merriam (1972) stated that "in spite of the drumfire of
visit-your-parks propaganda that emanated from the new bureau, the
earliest formal statement of the new National Park Service showed that
Lane, Mather, and company had a very clear and less selfishly motivated
idea of the nature and mission of a national park." He quoted the first
annual report of the Service, in 1916, as stating that the national
parks were not supposed to be thought of primarily in terms of
recreation. The report stated, "the fostering of recreation purely as
such is more properly the function of the city, county, and state parks,
and there should be a clear distinction between the character of such
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parks and national parks." Mather thus advocated a biocentric approach
to national park policy, but he recognized the fact that certain aspects
of anthropocentrism were a necessary part of any policy that was to have
wide public support. At that time in national park history, when the
national parks were still relatively unknown, generating substantial
public support was essential; therefore Mather's policies were not as
strongly biocentric as many preservationists would have liked.
The most important piece of policy that came out of the Mather era
was a letter from Secretary Lane to Mather, written in 1918. In it, the
administrative policies of the Park Service were spelled out. The
letter provided the basis for Park Service management that remains
fundamentally intact today. Ise (1961) quoted the three primary goals
from the letter:
First, that the national parks must be maintained in
absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations
as well as those of our own time; second, that they are set
aside for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the
people; and third, that the national interest must dictate
all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the
parks.
Significantly, preservation of the parks was the first priority listed.
According to Ise (1961), other policies set forth in the letter were:
Cattle grazing was allowed in areas not frequented by visitors in all
parks but Yellowstone; no leases were to be granted for summer homes;
no timber cutting was permitted, except for buildings, and only where it
would not affect the forest or landscape; roads were to harmonize with
the landscape; private inholdings were to be eliminated; all outdoor
sports, including winter sports, were to be encouraged; educational
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use, as well as recreational use of the parks, was a desired goal;
low-priced camps, as well as high-priced hotels, were to be offered to
visitors; concessioners were to be protected against competition, and
were to pay a revenue to the government, but not so that it would place
a burden on the visitor; the Service was to cooperate with city,
county, and state parks; the Service was to use the Railroad
Administration, chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and "auto-highway
associations" to advertise the parks; only areas of distinctive scenery
or unique features were to be considered for inclusion into the system.
The letter was widely believed to have been completely, or at least
partly, written by Mather and then signed by Lane. But in 1964 Albright
admitted writing the letter while Mather was recuperating from a nervous
breakdown (Garrison, 1980). The letter undoubtedly, expressed the
beliefs of both Mather and Albright, with Lane's approval, and reflected
Mather's primarily biocentric beliefs mixed with anthropocentric
provisions.
The letter has been called the "magna carta" of the national parks
(Mantell, 1979) because in it basic principles were set forth which more
clearly stated what the national parks were to be. It reflected a
biocentric orientation by stressing unimpaired preservation for the use
of future generations, but it also reflected some anthropocentrism by
advocating educational use of the parks, a range of facilities to serve
all income levels, and extensive advertisement of the parks. The letter
also set forth monopolized concessions as a desirable goal. While
Mather had always favored monopolies in the parks, the Lane Letter was
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the first official statement of them as National Park policy.
The Lane Letter was important for another reason: It came from
within the Service. The intent of Congress regarding specific park
policy was still unknown or nonexistent, and therefore it was left up to
Mather and Albright to create policy. Thus, Congress was willing to
leave the formation of park policy up to the Park Service. The
discretion left to the Service in 1918 is significant today because it
set a precedent for the role of Congress in national park management.
In 1925, another Secretary of the Interior, Hubert Work, restated
the national park mandate with even more emphasis on the preservation
aspect: "The duty imposed upon the National Park Service in the organic
act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for
posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other
activity" (Merriam, 1972).
When Albright succeeded Mather as director, Park Service policy
continued in the same direction Mather had started it, plus its duties
expanded to include management of new parks, historical sites, and
monuments; it also gained control over many units previously under the
Departments of War and Agriculture (Ise, 1961).
THE SERVICE AFTER MATHER AND ALBRIGHT
The outward expansion of the Service's responsibilities continued
when Arno Cammerer replaced Albright as director. Cammerer had served
under both Mather and Albright, and took over the Service in the midst
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of the Great Depression. During his administration, Congress
continually cut the parks' funding although visitation rose rapidly,
from almost 3.5 million in 1933 to almost 16.8 million in 1940 (Ise,
1961).
At the Service's urging Congress passed the Historic Sites and
Building Act of 1935 (16 U.S.C.S. 461 et seq.), which "declared it a
national policy to preserve such things for the inspiration and benefit
of the people" (Ise, 1961). The system also expanded to include
National Recreation Areas, National Parkways, National Seashores,
National Military Parks, National Capital Parks, and National
Cemeteries.
Also, during Cammerer's tenure as director conservation groups
became more organized and vocal about park policy, and he was criticized
by "purists" in the conservation movement for overbroadening the
Service's responsibilities, de-emphasizing and over-developing the
scenic parks and monuments, and making too many concessions to
commercial interests in newly established parks (Ise, 1961). This
criticism of the Service from within the national park movement marked
the beginning of a split between those who wanted only the most scenic
and pristine natural areas included in the system, and those who wanted
any area of nationally significant historic, cultural, or recreational
value, as well as outstanding scenery included in the system. This
difference of opinion has grown and polarized in the years since its
beginning as the Service's responsibilities have widened and the system
has grown.
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The controversy during Cammerer's directorship also marked the
beginning of active participation in the Park Service policy process by
organized conservation groups. Two of the most vocal critics were the
Wilderness Society and the National Parks Association (now the National
Parks and Conservation Association). Stephen Mather helped found the
N.P.A. in 1919 to, in the words of its organizers, "defend the National
Parks and Monuments fearlessly against assaults of private interests and
aggressive commercialism" (Ise, 1961). The N.P.A. had previously had
disagreements with Mather's policy, but the broadening of the system
under Cammerer was essentially the beginning of a continuing
disagreement over park policy. Ise (1961) described the dispute:
Some of the purists simply wanted one kind of park
administration, the Park Service believed in a somewhat
different sort of administration; and they were both
informed, enlightened, and sincere. To some extent the
difference was due to their different respective positions;
the purists were free of all responsibilities and could speak
and write without fear or inhibitions; the Park Service, on
the other hand, had a job to do, the job not only of
protecting the parks but of making them accessible—as
required, by implication at least, by the act of 1916—and of
winning friends and public support for them.
In other words, the "purists" were free to speak their mind without
restriction. The Park Service, on the other hand, had political
constraints. The diversification of the system, as well as the rise in
visitation that accompanied it, broadened the Service's constituency and
greatly increased the number of actors involved in the policy process;
many of these actors were much less "purist" oriented than others. The
purists basically feared that diversifying the system would cloud the
origins of the system, and that the addition of areas established
primarily to provide recreation would shift NPS policy away from the
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biocentrism they advocated.
Cammerer left the director's office in 1940, and was replaced by
Newton Drury. Drury was not a career Park Service man, but had
previously had contacts with Mather while serving as executive secretary
of the Save-the-Redwoods-League (Shankland, 1951). World War II was
fought during the first half of Drury's administration and most of his
efforts were directed toward preventing commercial interests from
exploiting the parks for timber, range, minerals, and water under the
guise of aiding the war effort (Ise, 1961). He was quite successful,
probably because the War ended before these interests could gain enough
support for their proposals. Drury was successful in preventing timber
and mineral extraction from Olympic Park, and in preventing dams from
being built in Glacier and the Grand Canyon (Ise, 1961).
Gas-rationing during the War was partly responsible for reducing
visitation to the parks; as a result most hotels in the parks were
closed or their seasons shortened. In Yellowstone, for instance, Lake
Hotel and all the lodges remained closed until the War ended (Haines,
1977). Congressional appropriations, as well as ranger and maintenance
forces, were largely lost to the war effort. As a result park
facilities fell into disrepair.
The War effectively ended the period of growth and expansion of the
national park system begun by Mather. During that period the number and
types of units in the system increased, policy was formed, and most
importantly, public use and support of the parks had increased
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dramatically. The national parks had gone from being rather obscure
pieces of federal land to being a popular part of American culture.
THE PARKS AFTER WORLD WAR II
In the years following World War II, the parks were inundated with
visitors. The automobile had become not only affordable to the average
American, but also a reliable means of transportation, and after the
combined hardships of the Depression and the War Americans began to
travel as never before possible. Tourism became a major national
industry; visitation to the parks jumped from 6.9 million in 1943 to
21.7 million in 1946, and to 29.6 million in 1948 (Drury, 1949). Park
concessioners had great difficulties providing the necessary services;
the hotels had deteriorated due to lack of maintenance, and as Ise
(1961) stated;
After five hungry years they had insufficient supplies, labor,
buses, and many other things; especially they lacked
experienced help and accommodations for their help, and had to
pay much higher wages for such inexperienced help as they
could get.
Drury was thus faced with circumstances opposite from those Mather
faced; the parks had become so popular that funding and staffing could
not keep up with the increases in visitation. Drury, like his
predecessors in the national park movement, used the media in an effort
to point out the problems in the parks. In 1949 he wrote an article in
American Forests in which he made a case for increased funding from
Congress; however, the necessary appropriations did not come during his
administration, and he was unable to solve the problems he faced.
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During his tenure Drury suggested two long range solutions to
overcrowding which became important years after he first conceived them.
In 1945, he considered moving concession facilities and administration
buildings out of congested areas of some parks; he also considered
earlier opening and later closing dates in some parks to spread
visitation out over a longer season, and proposed government
construction of concessioner facilities (Ise, 1961). His proposals to
manipulate visitors and facilities rather than the environment are
evidence of his strong biocentric orientation.
In fact, Drury was arguably the most "purist" oriented and
biocentric of the directors to that time, and his opposition to
commercial exploitation of the parks cost him the directorship in 1951.
He was forced to resign by the Secretary of the Interior because he
refused to support the Secretary's approval of construction of a system
of dams in Dinosaur National Monument (Ise, 1961). The situation was
one of park policy being formed above the agency, at higher levels of
the federal government, with the Secretary being the most visible actor.
Drury failed to implement the policy as dictated to him and was removed
from his position. Congress served to evaluate the policy by
overturning the Secretary's approval of the dams, after extensive
lobbying by several conservation organizations. Once again Congress did
not create policy, but acted as policy evaluators.
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Drury's biocentric argument for park preservation was quoted by Ise
(1961):
If we are going to succeed in preserving the greatness of
the national parks, they must be held inviolate. They
represent the last stand of primitive America. If we are
going to whittle away at them we should recognize, at the very
beginning, that all such whittlings are cumulative and that
the end result will be mediocrity. Greatness will be gone.
CONRAD WIRTH AND MISSION 66

\

In 1951 Conrad Wirth ascended to the directorship from within the
Service. His background was as a landscape architect; his first
association with the NPS came during the Great Depression when, as an
administrator with the Civilian Conservation Corps, he oversaw
construction projects in the parks (Wirth, 1980). His development
background signaled a significant shift in emphasis from Drury's
biocentrism toward a more anthropocentric philosophy.
During the early years of Wirth's directorship the parks continued
to deteriorate while visitation rapidly rose. In 1940 the national park
system included 161 areas encompassing 21.5 million acres, with
approximately 17 million visitors and appropriations of almost 33.5
million dollars; by 1955 the system had expanded to include 181 units
encompassing almost 24 million acres, with approximately 55.6 million
visitors, operating with appropriations of only 32.5 million dollars
(Wirth, 1980). In other words, during those 15 years the national park
system increased by 20 units, visitation tripled, but appropriations
from Congress decreased by a million dollars. One editorial placed the
blame for the park "crisis" on Congress for not appropriating sufficient
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funds, and on the concessioners for "enjoying monopolies,...taking
advantage of the situation" by providing poor service at high prices
(Netboy, 1955).
In February of 1955 Wirth devised a ten year plan to upgrade and
expand park facilities to meet the increasing visitor pressure. He felt
that a long term program, including proposals for developments in almost
every unit of the system rather than short term requests for the funding
of individual projects, would have a better chance of receiving broad
support in Congress because units in practically every state would
benefit (Wirth, 1980). He called the program Mission 66 (frequently
referred to as M66), and it was intended to culminate in 1966, the
fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the National Park Service. The
program was intended to get sufficient funding from Congress to improve
and expand facilities in the park system in order to accommodate 80
million visitors per year, the number estimated to be visiting the
system by 1966.
Wirth set up a "Mission 66 Committee" consisting of personnel in
the Washington office of the Park Service. Members were from the
divisions of Design and Construction, Operations, Interpretation, and
Cooperative Activities, with several branches under the Operations
Division also being represented (Wirth, 1980). This committee was given
the responsibility to develop the program. A "Steering Committee" was
also established, consisting of the supervisors of the members of the
Mission 66 Committee, which had the responsibility to "plan the scope
and pattern" of the main committee study (Wirth memo, 1955).
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Additionally, the regional offices established their own Mission 66
committees and individual parks created working committees to plan
projects at the park level (Wirth, 1980).
During 1955 the Mission 66 Committee conducted pilot studies of
several parks, set forth procedures, and directed each park to submit a
prospectus of projects needed (Wirth, 1980). The prospectuses consisted
primarily of updated park master plans. Individual park master plans
had existed in the system for several years; Wirth (1980) states that
they were essential to the Mission 66 program.
The problems of the parks had gained such notoriety that President
Eisenhower drew attention to them in his 1956 State of the Union
address, stating that his administration would submit recommendations to
provide more facilities for the public (Wirth, 1980). A bill for the
M66 program was submitted to Congress and passed with appropriations of
$786,545,000 (Vetter, 1957). The program began in July 1956 amid a
great deal of publicity put out by the Park Service. Robert Barbee
(pers. comm.) stated that "every [interpretive] program had to include
some sort of discussion of Mission 66. It was a great propaganda
effort. It was a stroke of genius to get a ten year commitment from
Congress. That was unheard of." Once the program had started, the
Mission 66 Committee was disbanded and the Steering Committee was
enlarged and reorganized as the "Mission 66 Advisory Committee", and
assigned to monitor the program (Wirth, 1980).
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Mission 66 was conceived, designed, and organized almost entirely
within the National Park Service. It came about largely because of
public criticism of the deterioration of the units in the park system,
but once the program began there was very little public input.
Therefore the NPS was the most important actor involved in the policies
of the program, and those policies reflected Wirth's strong
anthropocentrism. In a manual entitled Mission 66 For the National Park
System (USDI, 1956), sent out by the NPS Washington office to the field
employees as an explanation of the program, the Mission 66 philosophy
was enunciated. The Forward to the manual, entitled "The Basic Purpose
of the National Park System", reinterpretes the National Park Service
Act by reducing the Act's double mandate of preservation and use to a
single mandate to "promote and regulate use":
This act charges the National Park Service to do one
thing—to promote and regulate the use of the parks. This is
the one positive injunction placed upon the Service—a clear
statement of Service responsibility. The intent of the
remaining portion of this Act, which defines the purpose of
the National Park System, is clear, but its language leaves
room for interpretations which may obscure its true meaning.
The Forward went on to define the national park system in strictly
anthropocentric terms:
The National Park System is a national resource—a
natural resource, a historical resource, a cultural resource.
Like minerals, timber, soil, or water, it is a resource that
has meaning and value only when transmuted into products
useful to man...the primary justification for a National Park
System lies in its capacity to provide enjoyment in its best
sense, now and in the future.
The Forward did not go on to define "enjoyment in its best sense", but
it did refer to the preservation aspect of park management by declaring:
"To change the character of a park area in any important way destroys a
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part of its ability to yield...benefits to the human mind and spirit."
However, the meaning of "any important way" was not clarified, so what
was considered important change cannot be determined.
The National Park Service Act was referred to again in the main
part of the manual, in a statement that clearly reflects the
anthropocentric ideology of placing preservation within the context of
recreation:
"The law insisted that these areas were to be so managed that
their natural qualities would remain unimpaired; for only if
thus protected would they provide the fullest degree of
enjoyment and inspiration for present and future Americans.
Without the concept of public use and enjoyment the function
of preservation and protection is without meaning, (emphasis
added]
The manual went on to state: "It is the task of the National Park
Service, therefore, to assure the America people opportunity for maximum
beneficial use and enjoyment." The use of the word "maximum" perhaps
best reveals the approach of the Wirth administration toward park use.
The word had not been used in policy statements prior to Mission 66.
Mission 66 had a significant impact on virtually every unit of the
national park system. The program was eventually responsible for the
construction of: 1570 miles of reconstructed roads, 1197 miles of new
roads, 936 miles of new and reconstructed trails, 330 parking areas, 575
new camgrounds consisting of 17,782 campsites, 742 new picnic areas, 114
visitor centers, 584 new comfort stations, and 50 marinas, boating
ramps, and facilities; plus 535 new water systems, 521 new sewer
systems, 271 power systems, 221 new administrative buildings, 218 new
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utility buildings, as well as hundreds of employee residences, entrance
stations, lookout towers, and interpretive exhibits (Wirth, 1980).
CRITICISM OF MISSION 66
The Mission 66 program was initially welcomed by the interested
public as a dramatic step in the right direction. However, not too long
after the program began doubts were expressed. Without specifically
mentioning M66, Krutch (1957) wrote:
Up until now the original purpose of the national parks
and monuments has been fairly well preserved, partly as the
result of more or less conscious policy, more perhaps because
limitations of money and time have slowed down the tendency to
prevent it. But now that the integrity of the parks is being
increasingly threatened by would-be exploiters as well as by
the simple pressure of an increasing population looking for
"recreation"—a definite policy of protection from both ought
to be formulated. Along with the question of "good roads",
especially within the parks themselves, it would have to
consider all the other "improvements" and "facilities"
proposed and sometimes provided.
He went further by stating that "parks should not be turned into
resorts. And the distinction should be not how long the visitor stays,
but why and under what inducement". He then went on to reflect upon
Park Service philosopy and policy:
Are parks doomed in their turn to become mere resorts?
Ultimately perhaps. But how rapidly will depend largely upon
the philosophy which the Park Service formulates and the
support it can win for it. A wise one could make them last
out not only my time and yours but that for generations yet to
come.
Some conservation groups also began to question Park Service policy
early in the Mission 66 program. Everhart (1972) quoted the National
Parks Association as stating in 1958: "Conservationists and the lovers
of our national parks in general are becoming increasingly apprehensive

Page 55

about the trend toward some national parks becoming recreational
resorts."
By 1961 criticism of M66 had become relatively widespread. As had
been historically true, popular magazines were instrumental in making
the issue public. In February of 1961 Atlantic Monthly published a
series of articles under the heading "Our National Parks In Jeopardy".
One article in the series (Brooks, 1961) referred to the "much disputed
Mission 66", and hinted at some of the interest groups who pushed the
Park Service to develop the parks:
Some development is necessary; the danger today is that,
under pressure, it may be going hog-wild. I venture to
suggest that much of this activity—particularly the building
of roads for fast cars and marinas for fast boats—is based
on a mistaken premise. It is assumed that the public (as
distinguished from the automobile and motorboat industries)
demands these things and that the parks cannot be used without
them. Is this true?
The article went on to state: "This project, however legitimate its
objectives, is sometimes being carried to excess. One can only hope for
restraint, in both central planning and local execution."
The architectural style by the Park Service during M66 also came
under attack. Prior to the program, the "national park style" had been
one of generally simple rustic buildings, built with native materials,
which blended into the surrounding landscape (Wilson, 1976). However,
another article in the series (Butcher, 1961) stated:
Under Mission 66, too many of the parks are being
cluttered with buildings of freak and austere design. No
longer are the architects concerned with producing structures
of beauty and charm that help to create a proper atmosphere
and are inconspicuous and harmonious with their surroundings.
Rather, they seem obsessed with designing monuments to their
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own inventiveness. Widely critcized, these buildings are
unlike any others in the parks and are creating a hodgepodge
where, instead, there should be uniformity.
The article went on to call for the Park Service to adopt a policy
prohibiting construction of any further facilities in the central parts
of the parks, and also advocated the construction of necessary
facilities either just within the park entrances or outside the parks.
The Park Service also drew considerable criticism from several
conservation groups for the lack of resource protection, in particular
wilderness protection, included in M66 policies. As early as 1951, a
legally established "national wilderness preservation system" was
proposed, and from 1957 to 1964 several versions of wilderness
protective legislation were debated in Congress, culminating in the
Wilderness Act of 1964 (Hash, 1973). Wirth and the Park Service were
said to oppose a wilderness law (Craig, 1957), but Wirth (1980) claimed
that the Service did not want to be "included in it because the
protection section of the original bill was not as protective for
national parks wilderness as our own basic legislation". However,
Lemuel Garrison (pers. comm.), who served as the chairman of the
Mission 66 Steering and Advisory Committees, stated that the Service
felt that a wilderness bill "over-emphasized" the importance of
wilderness in parks. Garrison (1983) also stated that he felt
wilderness legislation was "redundant as it related to National Parks".
Whatever the reason, the passage of wilderness legislation was not
incorporated as an objective of M66, and that omission caused many
conservation groups to turn against the program (Garrison, pers.
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comm.)*
STUART UDALL AND THE LEOPOLD REPORT
A significant change occurred in the federal government during the
Mission 66 program which led indirectly to a change in Park Service
philosophy and policy. The program had begun with a Republican
administration in the White House that fully supported it, but in 1960 a
Democrat, John Kennedy, was elected president. While the Kennedy
administration's policies regarding national parks did not publicly
differ significantly from the Eisenhower administration's, there arose
several disagreements between the Kennedy Interior Department and
Wirth's National Park Service. First, Kennedy supported enactment of
wilderness legislation (Wirth, 1980). Also, Kennedy favored the
establishment of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) (Chubb and
Chubb, 1981) as an effort to begin comprehensive national outdoor
recreation planning; the NPS, on the other hand, felt that the BOR was
unnecessary and intruded upon the Park Service responsibility (Wirth,
1980).
Wirth (1980) cited incidents between the Kennedy Interior
Department and the Park Service which suggest friction between the
department and the agency, but the only public split in policy between
the two came about because of a controversy regarding the management of
elk in Yellowstone. Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall established
an Interior Department-level advisory board to examine the problem of
wildlife management in the national parks. The board's report,

Page 58

published in 1963 and known as the Leopold Report (Leopold et al.,
1963), dealt primarily with resource issues. However, it made
recommendations for park management which differed with some of the
principles of Mission 66. The report recommended that rather than
providing for public use, the "primary goal" for park management should

...that the biotic associations within each park be
maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly as
possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was
first visited by the white man. A national park should
represent a vignette of primitive America.
The report then questioned the appropriateness of many of the facilities
existing in the parks, including some being built under M66:
...it seems incongruous that there should exist in the
national parks mass recreation facilities such as golf
courses, ski lifts, motorboat marinas, and other extraneous
developments which completely contradict the management goal.
We urge the National Park Service to reverse its policy of
permitting these noconforming uses, and to liquidate them as
expeditiously as possible (painful as this will be to
concessionaires). Above all other policies, the maintenance
of naturalness should prevail.
Although the Leopold Report was not a rejection of existing NPS
policy and did not specifically criticize the Mission 66 program, it did
advocate a definite shift in NPS policy toward a more biocentric
approach to management. It sought to direct the Park Service away from
merely providing recreational opportunities toward scientifically
managing the parks as complex ecosystems. It urged the Service to
expand its research programs because of their importance as the basis
for management decisions.
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Because of the broad discretion left to the NPS in its organic act
Mission 66 and the Leopold Report could both be construed by their
respective proponents as appropriate under the law. Their differences
reflected fundamental differences in their philosophical orientations
toward management; the Leopold Report emphasized the preservation
aspect of the Service's legal mandate, Mission 66 emphasized the
promotion of use aspect. The Leopold Report can be regarded at least
partly as a reaction to the rejection of Mission 66 philosophy by the
interested public. The Park Service was directed by Udall to adopt the
Leopold Report as policy (Barbee, pers. comm.), and while it is
doubtful that the agency was completely pleased with the directive,
visitation to the system in 1963 had exceeded the M66 estimate for 1966
by 20 million people; the Service most certainly recognized that
constructing facilities to keep up with visitation was no longer
feasible, and probably also felt the need for an adjustment in policy.
The Leopold Report became "a kind of manifesto" for the Park Service
(Barbee, pers. comm.).
Mission 66 did not culminate in the dramatic fashion Wirth had
originally intended. In 1966 visitation to the system exceeded the M66
estimate of 80 million people per year by over 53 million, in spite of
several revisions of the M66 program (Wirth, 1980), and according to
Garrison (pers. comm.) the Service did not end the program, it merely
incorporated its objectives into long-term planning. Haines (1977)
states that the program "passed quietly out of the picture" when Udall
announced a new program entitled "Road to the Future", which
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"deemphasized construction of facilities". Wirth retired in early 1964
amid rumors that he was fired, but both he and Udall denied those rumors
(Wirth, 1980). However, whether or not his resignation was due in any
part to criticism of Mission 66 or to changes in policy dictated to the
Park Service from the Interior Department or Congress is impossible to
determine.
Because of the long-term effects of M66, the program has remained a
topic of discussion in the years since it ended. Darling and Eichhorn
(1969) wrote:
Thinking independently as individuals we have both felt
uneasy about the conception of Mission 66. It has seemed to
us that this operation over 10 years has been to increase
visitation, making it easier to get into the national parks
and that the visitors should be more comfortable in various
ways once they are there. Mission 66 has done comparatively
little for the plants and animals.
Mission 66, instead of being a far-sighted planning operation
to conserve these choice areas, seems to have been conceived
to allow more complete infTitration and uncritical use.
Hill (1972) called the program "a misguided spasm of political
cosmetology...nominally aimed at improving the parks, but also at
galvanizing public interest and stimulating appropriations". Udall
(1972) was undoubtedly referring to M66 when he wrote:
History has shown, incidentally, that "beneficent
projects" of one period—the building of unneeded roads is a
prime example—can be the bane of park administrators a few
years later.
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IMPORTANT ACTORS DURING THE MISSION 66 PROGRAM
Placed in a historical context, the shift in national park
management philosophy from the anthropocentric end of the spectrum
toward the biocentric side that occurred in the early 1960's was
dramatic. Therefore, a closer examination of the actors involved in
that shift is necessary.
Although Mission 66 policy was formulated and implementated within
the Park Service, the major evaluator of the program was essentially the
V
Interior Department, in the form of the Leopold Committee. Spokesman
for the public interest, largely through popular magazines, had provided
the impetus for the Mission 66 program by serving as informal evaluators
of previous policy, or lack of policy, after World War II. During the
course of the program the print media was also the means through which
informal public evaluation was expressed. By this time the public had
become a very important actor in the policy process because of the
tremendous increase in visitation to the parks, and organized
conservation groups had also grown in size and strength. Organizations
such as the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the National Parks
Association were important not only for their objections to M66, but
also for their efforts to convince Congress to pass wilderness
legislation which placed a legal obligation on the Park Service to
protect wilderness in parks.
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If a single most important actor in the national park policy
process during the period of the early 1960s is to be considered, that
actor would be Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. He was
responsible not only for establishing the Leopold Committee and for
directing that their recommendations be adopted as policy by the NPS,
but he also reorganized the national park system in 1964, based on Park
Service recommendations, into three management catagories—natural,
recreational, and historical (Lee, 1974). This reorganization
differentiated management policies for the various types of units of the
system and established "principles of resource management, resource use,
and physical development that should characterize each catagory" (Lee,
1974). This reorganization pleased conservationists who had felt since
the expansion of the system in 1933 that the preservation aspect of the
Service mandate had been obscured by the addition of units set aside for
recreational or historical purposes.
Udall was probably the most active secretary in the policy
formation environment of the park policy process, but more than that he
was instrumental in initiating the environmental movement that arose in
American society in the late 1960s. His years as secretary (1961 to
1969) have been described by Barbee (pers. comm.) as "a heady
time...incipient...sort of a conscious-building era before the
environmental movement". Udall wrote a book in which he desribed the
"quiet conservation crisis" of pollution, waste, and "vanishing beauty"
facing the United States in the 1960s, and the need to develop a "land
ethic for tomorrow" in which the "science of ecology" would be employed
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to provide a high standard of living as well as an unspoiled environment
(Udall, 1963). Udall as Secretary thus sought to change American
attitudes toward the environment, and his efforts to shift the emphasis
of national park policy toward a more biocentric approach were a part of
his efforts to change the national conservation agenda.
THE CONCESSIONS POLICY ACT
While Congress helped to push the NPS toward more biocentric
management by passing the Wilderness Act in 1964, the following year it
passed the Concessions Policy Act (16 U.S.C.S. 20 et seq.), which
indirectly helped to maintain a strong element of anthropocentrism in
park policy.
Concessions policy in the parks had historically been vague, and
after World War II it became a substantial problem because of exploding
visitation, NPS desires to accommodate all who wished to visit the
parks, and expansion of concession facilities. Three government reports
issued in 1963, two by Congressional committees and one by the General
Accounting Office, "urged that concession contracts made little economic
sense and that the government's policies amounted to subsidization of an
industry that no longer needed it" (Mantel!, 1979). Concessioners
objected to the studies and argued that policy changes recommended in
the reports would "discourage investment of private capital" which could
affect the quality of service and the rates charged to visitors
(Mantel 1, 1979). Congress, sensitive to the desires of private business
offering a public service and concerned about the potential for millions
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of dissatisfied park visitors, responded by passing the Concessions
Policy Act of 1965.
The Act was intended to insure quality service to park visitors by
protecting concessioners and insuring them a reasonable opportunity to
make a profit. It gave legal support for the longstanding policy of
monopolies in the parks, granted preferential rights to satisfactory
concessioners in the granting of new contracts, and gave possessory
interest to concessioners who constructed facilities within the parks.
The Act limited concessions to "those that are necessary and appropriate
for public use and enjoyment of the national park area in which they are
located and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with
the preservation and conservation of the areas"; however, it did not
define what facilities and services are to be considered "necessary and
appropriate". Mantel 1 (1979) articulated the objections of critics of
the Act:
The Concessions Policy Act of 1965, outdated when
written, has provided concessioners with too much protection.
It has helped entrench concessioners in the parks and has
enabled them to wield an unjustifiable degree of influence
over management policy and to obscure the purpose of the
parks. In order to stimulate investment and create more
services, the Act's design was to assure the concessioners a
profit. As a result, those services with a low cost, but high
return ratio, such as souvenir stores, snack bars, and liquor
stores are particularly favored.
The Park Service has been entangled in a statutory web of
promoting and encouraging use of concessions. Park
preservation and the concept of the park experience providing
a contrast which reinvigorates have been virtually forgotten,
giving way initially to the political necessity of creating
park use, then acceding to concessioner pressure and, finally,
to "user" desires.
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BIOCENTRISM SINCE MISSION 66
In the late 1960s an environmental movement arose in the United
States. Essentially begun by writers and scientists who warned of the
consequences of the continued deterioration of the earth's environment,
it was usually referred to as a revolution because it was an attempt to
drastically change society's values. Unlike the conservation movement
at the turn of the twentieth century, which was based in part in the
fear of running out of resources, this movement was based on "ecological
awareness [which] transcended concern for the quality of life to fear
for life itself" (Nash, 1982). Man was seen as "part of a larger
community of life, dependent for his survival on the survival of the
ecosystem and on the health of the total environment" (Nash, 1982). The
movement rejected the prevalent belief that advances in science and
technology would solve environmental problems as they reached the
critical point. Hence, the movement was a revolution because this "Myth
of Scientific Supremacy" (Udall, 1963) was replaced with a desire to
change the values of American society. Hardin (1968) explained the need
for value changes when he argued that some problems had no technical
solutions, but could be solved only by fundamental changes in human
values. He presented the thesis that the earth was much like a commons
shared by the entire human community and even seemingly insignificant
actions by one affected the quality of life for everyone in the
community.
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The revolution, which consisted primarily of young people led by
the writers and scientists, forced federal and state governments to
assume a more active role in environmental protection. Among the
important federal legislation passed were the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts (42 U.S.C.S. 25,1857-18571,1858,1858a and 33 U.S.C. 1151 et seq.,
respectively), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), and
the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
4321,4331-4335,4341-4347).
The national parks were a focal point for the environmental
revolution. They suffered from many of the same environmental problems
as the rest of the country—pollution, overcrowding, extinction of
wildlife species—and many felt that if those problems had already
reached these areas especially preserved, then there was little hope for
the rest of the nation. NPS Director Hartzog compared the parks to the
miner's canary as an early warning system for the environment (Darling
and Eichhorn, 1969).
During this period perhaps more was written and spoken about the
national parks than ever before in their history. Restatement of the
purpose of the parks and the role they would play in American society in
the future, redefinition of appropriate types of uses, and advocacy of
limiting use were common themes. Udall (1972) wrote that "[t]he park
idea will flourish only if it is constantly restated and made relevant
to the values esteemed by future generations". In general, most of what
was written during this time was very biocentric; the idea that the
Park Service should seek to maximize use was generally considered
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obsolete and replaced with various ideas to limit the types of use
allowed. Hill (1972) wrote:
The environmental revolution is doing something to save
the Park Service from its own follies of political
accommodation. The clamor for an improved "quality of life"
has included pressures to get the schlock out of the national
parks and not let their use eclipse preservation.
Conservation organizations were dominant actors in the efforts for
biocentric policies during the enviromental revolution. The
Conservation Foundation sponsored a study by an ecologist and a
geographer that examined park policy. The report of that study (Darling
and Eichhorn, 1969), first published in 1967, reiterated the Leopold
Report's criticisms of park development and anthropocentric policies.
It stated:
If national parks are to continue to be a retreat from
urban civilization for increasing numbers of people, much of
what was permissible in the less-crowded past will need to be
more carefully controlled or eliminated....the only absolute
administrative principle in the National Park Service is to
make ecological health or repose of an area the first
consideration.
The report ended by advocating limits on use and types of use:
In conclusion, we foresee a time of greater realization
that in an area of large, mobile, leisured populations, it is
a privilege rather than an unheeded right to visit the superb
national properties.... Certain forms of decorous behavior
should be accepted and not questioned. The National Gallery
of Art and the great museums expect and get such behavior
within their precincts. The national parks of the United
States present the glorious creations of nature and no
expediency or misconception of their beauty must endanger the
world heritage of which they are so shining a part.

Page 68

In 1968 Edward Abbey gained recognition as a radical
environmentalist-writer. His extremely biocentric view of what the
parks should be conflicted sharply with what he perceived them to be.
He spoke out against the leisure-seeking park visitor, and attacked what
he called "Industrial Tourism", the modern tourism which created and is
dependent upon the travel industry (Abbey, 1968):
Industrial Tourism is a big business. It means money.
It includes the motel and restaurant owners, the gasoline
retailers, the oil corporations, the road-building
contractors, the heavy equipment manufacturers, the state and
federal engineering agencies and the sovereign, all-powerful
automotive industry. These various interests are well
organized, command more wealth than most modern nations, and
are represented in Congress with a strength far greater than
is justified in any constitutional or democratic sense.
(Modern politics is expensive—power follows money.) Through
Congress the tourism industry can bring enormous pressure to
bear upon such a slender reed in the executive branch as the
poor old Park Service, a pressure which is also exerted on
every other possible level—local, state, regional— and
through advertising and the well-established habits of a
wasteful nation...
Industrial Tourism is a threat to the national parks.
But the chief victims of the system are the motorized
tourists. They are being robbed and robbing themselves. So
long as they are unwilling to crawl out of their cars they
will not discover the treasures of the national parks and will
never escape the stress and turmoil of those urban-suburban
complexes which they had hoped, presumably, to leave behind
for a while.
In 1972 the Conservation Foundation issued a report of a task force
organized to coincide with the centennial of the creation of Yellowstone
National Park (Conservation Foundation, 1972). The task force advocated
preservation as the primary function of the NPS, restricting automobile
use, turning concessions over to non-profit, quasi-public corporations,
expanding biological and sociological research, and the NPS taking the
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lead in environmental education; the biocentrically-oriented report
also stressed the importance of wilderness management in national parks
and elimination of inappropriate facilities and activities.
Stewart Udall, almost four years after his term as Secretary of the
Interior ended, joined in the discussions of the role of the national
parks and how they should be used:
The parks were not intended for these kinds of travelers,
who come to the rims of canyons and the foothills of mountains
to peer at the parks. The parks are preeminently for those
who relish the rugged life and who are willing to get off the
beaten paths and into the silent cathedrals of the out of
doors. National parks must always be quintessentially nature
parks, and their preferred customers will be those ready to
make the physical effort to get acquainted with their secret
places and catch the "barks and tonics" of their wilderness
fragrances. (Udall, 1972)
By 1974 the anthropocentrism of the Mission 66 era had been fully
supplanted by biocentic park policy, at least in theory if not totally
in practice. An assistant director of the Service wrote that
n [iIndisputably

preservation comes first in law. Indisputably it comes

first in logic—without preservation the rest is utterly pointless"
(Utley, 1974). His statement was a complete turnaround from the M66
edict that "[w]ithout the concept of public use and enjoyment the
function of preservation and protection is without meaning" (USDI,
1956).
Although the environmental revolution subsided by the mid-1970s
environmental awareness did not end, and efforts to push the NPS toward
more biocentric management continued. Sax (1980) perhaps wrote the
definitive argument for the biocentric philosophy. He offered what he
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called the "preservationist point of view"; in his opinion, "[t]he
preservationist is not an elitist who wants to exclude others....he is a
moralist who wants to convert them". He went on to describe the
preservationist position:
The preservationist does not condemn the activities he
would like to exclude from the park. He considers them
perfectly legitimate and appropriate—if not admirable—and
believes that opportunities for conventional tourism are amply
provided elsewhere: at resorts and amusement parks, on
private lands, and on a very considerable portion of the
public domain too. He only urges a recognition that the parks
have a distinctive function to perform that is separate from
the service of conventional tourism, and that they should be
managed explicitly to present that function to the public as
their principal goal, separate from whatever conventional
tourist services they may also have to provide.
Like Olmsted a hundred years before, Sax based his argument of what
constitutes appropriate park use, not on the activities and facilities
provided for the park visitor, but on the attitudes the visitor brings
to the park and the atmosphere the manager provides for the visitor. He
stressed the importance of the experience the visitor derived from his
visit; those activities which afforded the visitor an unconstrained
experience which involved some form of risk and challenge to the
individual were to be encouraged by management. He referred to such
activities as "reflective" or "contemplative" recreation, and stated:
Rather than seeking mainly to serve the wide variety of
recreational preferences visitors bring with them, park
managers would encourage all visitors—whatever their past
experiences or skills—to try more challenging and demanding
recreation. While the Park Service may believe it is doing
this effectively now, the actual pattern of park visitations
suggests a quite different conclusion.
Sax said the issue of automobiles in parks was "not an issue of
transportation, but of pace"; the automobile tourist was simply not

Page 71

induced to get out of his vehicle and engage in contemplative
recreation. He argued that the purpose of having natural areas
preserved was "to expose, rather than to insulate", in order for the
visitor to more fully experience the unique character of the area.
Sax argued that the Park Service should seek to "unbundle" their
goals. Rather than trying to be all things to all people they should
provide an opportunity for a specific type of recreational experience,
by encouraging contemplative recreation. He attacked concessions
policy:
Under the present practice, with a plethora of concessioners
offering a wide variety of services, and with strong economic
incentives to stimulate additional clientele, the system works
to bundle together as much as possible of what should be
separate. Under the approach suggested here, the emphasis
would be on the maximum possible separation ...Supportive
services—supply stores, unpretentious restaurants associated
with hotels, and gas stations in more remote parks— are also
perfectly appropriate. What do not belong in such places are
facilities that are attractions in themselves, lures that have
nothing to do with facilitating an experience of the natural
resources around which the area has been established.
He cited souvenir shops, swimming pools, and organized concessioner
activities such as horseback rides as inappropriate because they
discouraged the visitor from experiencing the park himself.
Sax's argument is uniquely biocentric because it focuses on the
visitor's experience rather than the appropriateness of facilities or
developments. To him the attitudes behind visitor behavior and
management policy were the important considerations; any activity or
development could be considered appropriate in the parks as long as it
facilitated the experience he felt should be derived from them. Certain
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developments simply tended to discourage the visitor from seeking the
experiences Sax advocated. His biocentrism was a result of his belief
that only by preserving the natural qualities of national parkf and
^
allowing the visitor to experience it on an individual basis
unencumbered by mass recreation facilities and activities could the
visitor be insured of obtaining the desired recreational experience.
McCool (1983) believes, like Sax, that recreational preferences are
changing. He based his opinion on the wave theory presented by Toffler
(1980). Toffler theorized that cultural development occurs in waves.
The First Wave, which lasted thousands of years, dominated early
cultural development and was characterized by small agrarian communities
with primitive technology and substantial leisure time, used primarily
for religious celebrations. The Second Wave was characterized by the
Industrial Revolution, with more urban societies, advanced technology,
and limited, structured leisure time. The Third Wave, which is now
overtaking society today, is characterized by greatly increased
technology, flexible work schedules, and a shift of the work place back
to the home; all of which help decentralize society. The Third Wave is
also characterized by increased, flexible leisure time.
McCool asserted that the Third Wave has important implications for
recreation managers such as the Park Service:
...recent trends in recreation activity participation suggest
that the Third Wave holds the possibility of major surprises.
Less emphasis on entertainment, more focus on involvement,
appreciation rather than consumption, self actualization in
place of mass amusement. These suggest that the park
experience may be more demanding—and more rewarding—for
both the visitor and the manager.
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Thus McCool, like Sax, believes that recreational preferences in
the future will be more physically and mentally demanding, and less
convenience- oriented than in the past; Should this be the case, it
follows that biocentric management will be most able to provide those
types of activities; structured activities designed to entertain the
visitor which were favored under the anthropocentric philosophy will be
less in demand.
In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president, and his choice for
secretary of the Interior, James Watt, became perhaps the most active
secretary since Stewart Udall. However, Watt's policies differed
significantly from Udall's. He firmly believed in maximum resource
development on all available public lands, even on wilderness; his
philosophy toward the parks was one of extreme anthropocentrism, and he
pushed for their maximum use by the public. His federal land policies
were a 180 degree turnaround from the trend in policy that had developed
over the previous twenty years.
In 1981 Watt spoke at a conference of national park concessioners.
His speech reflected the strong anthropocentrism upon which he based his
policy. Frome (1981) quoted parts of the speech. Referring to the
concessioners, Watt stated:
You are going to play a tremendously important and
growing role in the administration of our national parks, and
we are going to reach out to involve you in some areas that
you haven't been asked to be involved in before.
As had been done during the Mission 66 period, he placed preservation of
the parks within the context of recreation when he stated, "I will err
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on the side of public use versus preservation". He essentially made the
concessioners the dominant actor in the park policy process by stating,
"Don't be hung up on protocol. If a personality is giving you a
problem, we're going to get rid of the problem or the personality,
whichever is faster".
Conservation groups and those in the public who supported the
trends in park policy since the Leopold Report objected vociferously to
Watt's statements. Many immediately began to call for his resignation.
He eventually did resign, for reasons other than his federal land
policies, and it is doubtful that he significantly altered the trend in
park policy away from the biocentrism that had begun twenty years
earlier. Watt's policies were compared to those of the federal
government in the nineteenth century which had advocated conquering the
Western frontier. Nash (1982) spoke for many of Watt's critics when he
stated that "[t]he Reagan administration's championing of the frontier
perspective might be a final flare-up of values approaching
obsolescence".
SUMMARY
Although the first suggestions for establishing national parks were
generally based in biocentric philosophy, the first national park was
reserved primarily for anthropocentric reasons. Policy has historically
shifted along a continuum between anthropocentrism and biocentrism,
however an element of biocentrism has existed in management policy, even
during periods when anthropocentrism dominated. In the early 1960s,
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increased understanding of ecological interactions in natural systems
and changing public attitudes helped cause a dramatic shift in park
policy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism. In the years since
that shift arguments for biocentric management of the parks have gained
in intensity and strength.
The earliest and perhaps most persistent national park advocates
throughout park history have been popular writers and artists who,
through their works, have publicized and popularized the parks.
However, national parks became a reality largely through the efforts of
economic interests. These interests have grown and diversified as
visitation to the parks has increased. The growth of the conservation
movement in the early twentieth century, and subsequently the
environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, established a park
constituency concerned primarily with preservation of natural values.
These "preservationists" generally have biocentrism as their
philosophical basis, while the economic interests generally favor
anthropocentrism. Most park management controversies have resulted from
the conflicting perceptions these groups have of what national parks
should be.

CHAPTER THREE:
A CASE STUDY OF GRANT VILLAGE
INTRODUCTION
The road system that exists today in Yellowstone National Park
essentially follows the same course as the first roads in the Park,
which were designed by the Park's second superintendent. The roads loop
through the interior of the Park in a figure-eight (referred to as the
"Grand Loop") with auxiliary roads connecting the loops to the five park
entrances. The roads were originally built to transport tourists to the
most outstanding features, and Park accommodations were historically
built at most of the scenic points-of-interest: Mammoth Hot Springs,
Upper Geyser Basin (Old Faithful), West Thumb Geyser Basin, the north
shore of Yellowstone Lake (near the outlet of the Yellowstone River),
the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River, Tower Falls, and Fountain
Paint Pots (facilities there no longer exit). (See Fig. 2)
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EARLY PLANNING
By the 1930s NPS personnel recognized that having major visitor
facility developments located on or near fragile areas or areas of
significant scenery, such as geyser basins and the Canyon rim, was
detrimental to the scenic beauty of the area. In 1935 the Park master
plan included recommendations for relocating the road and some
facilities away from the Old Faithful area, and in 1936 the master plan
recommended relocating facilities away from the West Thumb Geyser Basin
as well (Wirth, 1980). The development at West Thumb had been built in
the 1920s and 1930s at the "wye" formed by the junction of the Lower
Loop road and the south entrance road, and included a ranger station, a
general store, a photo shop, a cafeteria, tourist cabins, a boat office,
a boat dock, and support facilities (Yellowstone Park Master Plan,
1953). By this time concessions in the Park were divided between three
family-run concessioners: the photo shops (now operated by Hamilton
Stores) were run by Haynes Photo; the general stores were run by
Hamilton Stores; the lodging, dining, transportation, horse rides, and
boating facilities were run by Yellowstone Park Company (YPCO); and the
gas stations were run jointly by Hamilton and YPCO (USDI, 1976). These
concessioners had helped direct planning toward having commercial
facilities at the "wye", but after World War II the NPS cited increased
visitation, travel trends, and encroachment upon the thermal area as
reasons for moving these facilities from the site (Yellowstone Park
Master Plan, 1953). The area south of the West Thumb development was
surveyed, following the shoreline of Thumb Bay in 1946 and 1947 (Haines,

Page 79

pers. comm.), and in 1947 a decision to relocate the West Thumb
facilities was made at a field meeting "at which many of the interested
parties including the concessioners were present" (Yellowstone Park
Master Plan, 1953). Also according to the 1953 master plan the
campground, service station, and garage would have remained at the
"wye", but by 1949 the NPS decided it would be desirable to have "the
wye free of all commercial development". It was at this time that NPS
Director Drury had recommended moving concessions facilities and
administration buildings out of congested areas of the national parks,
and although the West Thumb move was suggested before Drury was
director, his recommendations most certainly gave new impetus to the
idea in the years after World War II.
However, the relocation was not carried out in those post-war
years. In fact, no on-site work was done between 1947 and 1956 (Haines,
pers. comm.), primarily due to the financial shortcomings of both the
Park Service and the concessioners. Concession facilities continued to
deteriorate after the War, as they had during the War when most
facilities were closed, largely due to Yellowstone Park Company's
financial problems (Haines, 1977). Concessions in the Park had never
been particularly sound financially, and the lack of income during the
War had left YPCO especially vulnerable. The Northern Pacific Railroad
had been a financial backer of the company since the early days of the
Park (Bartlett, 1983), but by the end of World War II had recognized
that the automobile would continue to be the primary means of
transportation for tourists and decided to end their financial support
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of YPCO (Haines, 1977).
As the post-war financial problems increased so too did the numbers
of visitors to the Park, along with visitor dissatifaction. The state
of Wyoming recognized the adverse effects visitor dissatisfaction in
Yellowstone could have on the state's economy. A study conducted in
1950 estimated that Park traffic generated almost $19 million worth of
business in the immediate vicinity (Haines, 1977). In February of 1955,
the Wyoming State Legislature passed a proposal for the state to
purchase YPCO's operation (Haines, 1977). It was that same month and
year that Wirth conceived the idea that was to become Mission 66 (Wirth,
1980), and Haines (pers. comm.) believes that the M66 program was in
effect a direct response to the Wyoming effort to gain control of
Yellowstone concessions; the NPS was vigorously opposed to the proposal
because of the potential for problems of state involvement in federal
land management. Aside from the possibility that it provided the spark
for the M66, the Wyoming proposal was important because it showed the
importance the state placed on having adequate concession facilities
within the Park.
The proposal went no further because YPCO received a loan from
Eastern banking interests in 1956 to replace the backing of the Northern
Pacific Railroad, who had liquidated its interest in the company in 1955
(Haines, pers. comm.). Yellowstone Park Company then had its
concession contract renewed by the Park Service in 1956, and part of the
contract was a promise to build their part of the Canyon Village project
(planned to replace the development located along the Canyon rim) as the
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first phase of the Mission 66 program in Yellowstone (King, pers.
comm.).
MISSION 66 IN YELLOWSTONE
With the beginning of Mission 66 new emphasis was placed on
improving and relocating facilities as called for in Park master plans,
as well as on building new developments. The Mission 66 program for
Yellowstone (USDI, undated), based on the recommendations of the Park
Working Committee (which consisted of the superintendent and other Park
administrators), called for doubling the number of lodging
accommodations within the Park, more than doubling campground capacity,
and increasing other visitor services. Specific developments called for
were: Canyon Village (already under construction at the time the
program for Yellowstone was written) consisting of a campground and 500
cabins, plus stores, a restaurant, a visitor center, cabin office, and
snack shop built in a horseshoe shape around three sides of a parking
plaza; a recreational vehicle campground and expanded campground at
Fishing Bridge (at the outlet of the Yellowstone River from Yellowstone
Lake); Grant Village (originally to be called "Thumbbay"), to be
located 1.5 miles south of West Thumb along Yellowstone Lake, and
intended to replace the West Thumb development; Bridge Bay, located
approximately two miles from Lake Hotel along the shore of Yellowstone
Lake, consisting of a campground and marina and intended to replace the
boat docks in front of Lake Hotel and at Fishing Bridge; Firehole
Village, suggested to possibly begin late in the M66 program and
intended as a replacement for facilities at Old Faithful. The entire
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program was intended to increase guest capacity in the Park from 8,500
to approximately 14,500, with most of the increase coming from
construction of new cabins. This figure was not a ceiling on the guest
capacity of the Park, but was what was believed to be necessary to meet
the demand for overnight accommodations in the coming years.
As evidence of the magnitude of the concessions problems in
Yellowstone as viewed by the Park Service, in 1956 Lemuel Garrison,
chairman of the Mission 66 Advisory Committee, was sent from the
Washington Office of the NPS to be superintendent. He was instructed to
get the program for the Park under way, and within a year Canyon
Village, which had been in the planning stage for twenty years, was open
to the public (Haines, 1977). Canyon Village was one of the first
projects begun under the system-wide M66 program and was used as a focal
point for the program; it was presented as an example of what M66 would
do for the national parks. The groundbreaking ceremony at Canyon was
highly publicized, and attended by "Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Wesley A. D'Ewart, National Park Service Director Conrad L. Wirth,
State officials of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, members of Congress and
representatives of conservation and business groups" (USDI press
release, 1956).
PROBLEMS WITH CANYON VILLAGE
Yellowstone Park Company estimated that their part of the
construction at Canyon Village would cost $2.5 million, but the final
cost was much higher, due to it being built on a cost-plus basis, which
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caused more serious financial problems for the company (Haines, pers.
comm.). Garrison (pers. comm.) however, denied that construction of
Canyon caused the company problems; he stated that their problems were
due to accounting errors and poor management.
Whatever the cause of the company's financial problems, they were
compounded after Canyon Village was opened. Although the old lodge on
the Canyon rim had been razed when the Village was built, the old Canyon
Hotel remained open to the public and was filled to capacity almost
every night during the 1957 and 1958 seasons; the new Village, more
expensive to stay in, "went begging" (Haines, 1977). That trend was "so
inimical to that precarious financing on which Canyon Village was based
that the Yellowstone Park Company decided to abandon the hotel in order
that the Canyon Village units might be filled and the investment there
made to pay its way" (Haines, 1977). The hotel was then sold for
salvage in 1959 and its hulk accidently burned in 1960 (Haines, 1977).
However, eliminating competition from their own hotel did not solve
YPCO's financial problems:
...even that massive sacrifice was insufficient. The cost of
the Canyon Village development was more than the Yellowstone
Park Company could bear; just a hair's-breath short of
bankruptcy its affairs were placed under the management of a
board representing the mortgage holders. (Haines, 1977)
Hence, the bankers who backed YPCO must have felt, like Garrison, that
the company's problems were at least partly due to mismanagement.
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FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH YELLOWSTONE PARK COMPANY
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty the concessioner had with
Canyon Village, the NPS pushed forward with Grant Village. No on-site
work had been done from the time the area was surveyed in 1947 until
surveying was restarted in 1957 (Haines, pers. comm.). The Western
Office of Design and Construction of the NPS, located in San Francisco,
took over the project from park level planners in 1959 (NPS Advisory
Board (1), undated). In 1961 the government cleared the forest (Haines,
corr.) and began construction of their part of the Grant Village
facilities. By 1962 roads, utilities, a campground, and a boat launch
were complete and opening ceremonies were held (NPS Advisory Board (1),
undated). The Village was dedicated and named for President Ulysses
Grant, who had signed the Yellowstone Act into law.
In 1963 the NPS Division of Concessions Management in Washington,
DC, hired the director of the University of Denver Hotel School, Dr.
Ralph Wilson, to study Yellowstone Park concessioners (Flynn memo,
1964). Dr. Wilson's report was extremely critical of YPCO. In a
letter to Superintendent Garrison, Wilson summarized what the study had
concluded about the company (Wilson letter, 1963):
In the past few years there has been a lack of adequate
operating management present in the YPCO and as a result no
positive plans or continuity of operation has resulted. No
positive leadership has been exercised and at the present time
the Company is looking to the Park Service for ideas as to
necessary services and facilities. It is also quite evident
that a conflict of ideas exist between the ownership of the
company and the management committee. The demands for
dividends and the demands for money for new construction and
remodeling are in constant conflict. The management committee
has little or no equity ownership but does have operating
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interests in the earnings and continued life of the company.
Wilson went on to state the company's financial situation was such that
rehabilitation of facilities and construction of new facilities could
not be accomplished using the company's potential earnings, and that the
Park Service had allowed "accommodations 'slums'" to develop in the
Park. He stated that "services provided by the YPCO to the visitors of
Yellowstone Park left much to be desired in the way of cleanliness of
the rooms, adequate service in the dining rooms, coffee shops and
cafeterias", and that the quality of food and service deteriorated in
the latter half of the summer season due to lack of employees. Wilson
felt that room rates could be lowered to be comparable to rates charged
in communities surrounding the Park. He also noted that little or no
screening was done when the company hired its seasonal employees, and
stated that substandard housing for employees contributed to attitude
problems.
With regard to Grant Village, Wilson wrote:
That [sic] it is economically feasible for 150 motor
hotel units with coffee shop and other services to be built at
Grant Village. The construction should be adequate space
accommodations but not luxury accommodations...The area will
develope [sic] slowly and plans for additional motel units
should be made for construction when demand develops.
He made suggestions about solving the company's financial problems:
The financial condition of the YPCO is such that
consideration must be given to means other than profit to
provide funds necessary for rehabilitation, remodeling, and
new construction...
Due to the need for capital funds for remodeling, general
upgrading of facilities, and the need for new construction it
is not desireable for the YPCO to declare stockholder
dividends in the near future. Without possible dividends and
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since ownership and management have been separated in the
company it would be to the owners benefit to sell the YPCO to
a more financially sound operating company.
That same year Garrison informed the company "that the quality of
their service was so poor that I felt their contract was in jeopardy.
This created a major fracas, and unfortunately the major drive seemed to
be to get me fired, instead of improving service" (Garrison, 1983).
During the next two years the Service pressured YPCO to build their
part of Grant Village, but the company refused, claiming that they could
not secure construction capital (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). In
1964, Dr. Wilson issued a supplemental report to his 1963 study (NPS
Advisory Board (1), undated). That report dealt with concession
financing of the proposed Grant Village, which was planned at the time
to consist of "2,700 pillows [number of overnight guests in lodging
facilities] in 414 motel units, 240 kitchen apartment units, 246 canvas
cabins, and 900 seats in coffee shop and cafeteria feeding units"
(Wilson, 1964). The report (Wilson, 1963) found that a twenty year loan
to cover 100 per cent of construction cost of the development would make
the project feasible for the company, but recommended consideration of
having another, more financially sound, company than YPCO building and
operating Grant. The report stated that "the investment of some equity
capital rather than one hundred [per cent] financing would improve the
profit possibilities of the operation". The company still did not act,
but in spite of YPCO's recalcitrance, the NPS continued to build their
part of the Village. Garrison was transferred to Omaha to head the
Midwest Region of the NPS that same year (Haines, 1977), and to what
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extent his battle with concessioners over Grant Village contributed to
the decision to transfer him is impossible to determine. He had other
conflicts with interest groups from the Yellowstone region during his
tenure in the Park, and it is possible that there simply was too much
friction in the political climate for him to continue to be an effective
administrator.
LEMUEL GARRISON AND GRANT VILLAGE
Garrison's role in Yellowstone during Mission 66 was extremely
important and thus deserves closer analysis. He described his reasons
for strongly supporting the completion of Grant Village (Garrison,
1983):
The creation of Grant Village was one of the "horizon"
events from the beginning. I encouraged it because we needed
to replace the West Thumb complex. Hamilton's Store was new
and adequate. Everything else was dilapidated. The public
campground was worn out by our standards—road ruts, dust,
crowded, and scant vegetation; however, campers used it and
used it. Overnight cabins were forlorn and maintenance was
poor. A tiny dock and marina were inadequate. Roads,
campers, playing children, all were mixed up with each other
around the boat areas. The abrasive gravel land surface of
West Thumb lacked dignity, usability, safety, and information
services. Yet it was at a major road intersection, and from
the shoreline we had a great view up the lake to the Absaroka
Mountains and "the Wilderness."
We had so much wilderness. It was a popular topic of
planning. But there had been few access points. Grant
Village would become the wilderness take-off point. Trails
would lead to Heart Lake and Flat Mountain Arm. A short trail
from Lewis Lake would provide access to Shoshone Lake and on
into the Bechler River country. The interpretive theme of our
visitor center would be "The Wilderness and Ways to Enjoy It."
Our new marina would be a takeoff point for canoes, and
include a major campground, a campfire circle, and a visitor
center. This would be a great congregation point.
Garrison (1983) described himself as "both user- and preservation-
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oriented". He felt that proper development could reduce human impacts
on the resource (Garrison, 1964); he referred to his concept as
"development as a tool of preservation" (Garrison, 1973), and was
therefore, in his own words, "development oriented" to that extent
(Garrison, pers. comm.). He reflected the desire to accommodate
increasing visitation and the ambivalence toward wilderness that existed
in the NPS during Mission 66 when he stated:
The whole thrust at that point in time was to serve more
visitors. Travel was on the upswing. The roads could handle
more cars with only minor work, such as turn-outs, vista
clearing, and curve straightening. But the pressing need was
for visitor services. We were still destroying wilderness.
Grant Village was a normal outcome of this growth pattern in
1963. (Garrison, 1983)
Although he was a primary architect for the system's Mission 66
program, and was sent to Yellowstone to carry the program out there, it
is important to recognize that he came to realize that the Service could
not continue to attempt to provide accommodations for all who wished to
visit Yellowstone. Garrison (1973) reflected on the situation as it
existed at the time:
In the context of the times, we were still operating under the
principle that every visitor that wanted to come to
Yellowstone, you'd let him in. If he wanted to camp, you
tried to provide a campground for him. We got off of that
before very long because it became obvious we had to do
something in restriction...camping, for instance. We built
the Madison Junction Campground, rebuilt it, enlarged it. We
built the West Thumb, or Grant Village Campground, but it was
so obvious that to really meet the forward demand, we would
end up with a ring of campgrounds around Yellowstone Lake from
Grant Village through to Mary Bay, which was about 33 miles,
and they'd be full all the time. This was a perversion of the
purpose of the park. So we just finally, I say finally, it
wasn't too late in coming, adopted the principle we just
weren't going to expand our campgrounds at all. Weren't going
to add any more camp capacity. So that, I think, was one of
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the major decisions,...! look at it as a wise decision.
Garrison faced several controversies during his term as Yellowstone
Superintendent. Besides Grant Village, there was an intense public
debate over the Service's elk reduction program; the argument reached
the Secretary of the Interior's office and led to the Leopold Report.
However, perhaps the hottest local issue he had to deal with was the
reaction of boating interests to his proposal to close portions of
Yellowstone Lake to motorboats. Boating on the Lake had been a
tradition that originated in the late nineteenth century, and after
World War II had become very popular, especially with people from
surrounding communities. Garrison's proposal drew such criticism from
local, as well as national boating clubs, that there were a series of
Congressional hearings held in the Park and surrounding communities
(Garrison, 1973). A compromise zoning system was finally approved, but
it is likely that the controversy had a negative effect on Garrison's
effectiveness. The controversy is particularly important to
understanding Garrison's role in the histories of Mission 66 and Grant
Village because although he was responsible for the construction of two
marinas that were intended to accommodate those who wished to boat on
Yellowstone Lake, he risked his career by proposing a zoning system
which was intended to protect the wildlife of the Lake and to keep the
numbers of boat users down.
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Garrison was replaced by John McLaughlin in 1964.
GENERAL HOST CORPORATION
In 1966 the NPS director wrote Secretary Udall about YPCO's failure
to build Grant Village, and Superintendent McLaughlin proposed
construction of an initial 500 rooms by 1972, with 400 more to be built
later if visitor trends indicated the need (NPS Advisory Board (1),
undated). In that same year YPCO was sold to Goldfield Corporation,
which "through various mergers and acquisitions, evolved into the
General Host Corporation" (USDI, 1976), a "mini-conglomerate" (Frome,
1981) which was granted a thirty-year lease to operate all of YPCO's
facilities and services with the provision that they build "500 housing
units and related facilities at a cost of not less than $5 million by
the end of 1971 at Grant Village" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated).
Overall the contract "required that a minumum capital expenditure [$10
million], according to a specified schedule of projects [primarily Grant
Village] be completed by December 31, 1975", and if the company did not
comply, its contract could be terminated (USDI, 1976).
Thus by the late 1960s the government had built at Grant Village a
visitor center and ranger station, as well as a marina, a campground,
roads, utilities, and parking lots, and had cleared the forest where the
lodging was to be located. In all, it had spent $7 million (Anzelmo,
per. comm.) and finally had a commitment from the concessioner to
complete the development.
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However, in 1969 a feasibility study of Grant Village was done by a
private firm hired by the new Yellowstone Park Company (NPS Advisory
Board (2), undated). The study found that it would be difficult for the
company to recoup its investment from room revenues because of the short
season (Edlund, pers. comm.) and maintenance costs (King, pers.
comm.), and thus concluded that Grant Village was not economically
feasible (Edlund, pers. comm.).
Jack Anderson, who replaced McLaughlin as Yellowstone
superintendent in 1966 (Anderson, pers. comm.), recommended in 1970
minimal development at Grant Village to make it an "operational entity"
(NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). Anderson's recommendations included
converting the parking lots already in place into a recreational vehicle
campground and having it and the campground already in place as the only
overnight facilities (Anderson, pers. comm.). Anderson (pers. comm.)
thought Grant Village was a mistake, citing bad climate, short season,
snow levels, wind, and the presence of grizzly bears as reasons, and
suggested to the Director that the NPS "take our red face and walk back
to Congress and say, 'We made a real mistake here. We think we should
pull out.1" (Anderson, pers. comm.)
The Director did not take Anderson's advice, but instead sought
another solution to the concessioner problem. According to Everhart
(1972) the Director went to Congress:
Testifying before the House Appropriations committeee in
April, 1971, the Park Service Director announced that almost
one-third of all park concessioners lost money in 1970 and
that an equal number, from a financial point of view, could be
considered only marginal operations. He informed the
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committee that he intended to request appropriations to
purchase the holdings of General Host and concluded, "I am
confident that that is just a prelude to buying out the
possessory interests of a number of other concessions".
However, the Office of Management and Budget turned down his request
(Everhart, 1972).
THE YELLOWSTONE MASTER PLAN OF 1973
By the early 1960s the Mission 66 program for Yellowstone was being
criticized just as was the nation-wide program. Butcher (1961)
expressed a lengthy opinion about M66 in Yellowstone:
Yellowstone is the scene of one of the most expansive and
elaborate of Mission 66 projects. A lodge and cabins were
torn down on the south rim of the spectacular canyon of the
Yellowstone River. Well rid of the unsightly structures, this
beauty spot is being restored to nature; but across the
canyon and back in the woodland, a whole new village has been
built, complete with lodge, dozens of boxlike cabins for
visitors, two two-story dormitories for employees, a
concessioner's office building, store, visitor center, and a
large parking area.
As elsewhere, the Park Service built a case to justify
this big development. It is said that Yellowstone is so vast
and remote that it cannot be experienced in a single day, and
visitors need facilities to enable them to remain in the park
either overnight or for a week or more. The park prospectus
explains that Yellowstone visitors will reach an estimated two
million by 1966 and that overnight accommodations must be
expanded from the 8500 capacity of 1955 to 15,000 in 1966;
and this calls for increased housing, food, medical supplies,
and other services of a "small city." More visitors'
facilities require more employees. Together with utilities,
this project has cost $70 million. Concerning the removal of
the earlier development, a Park Service release quoted
Director Conrad L. Wirth as saying, "The old development is
an intrusion on the natural scene which the Service is charged
by law to preserve." How could the director fail to see that
the new village is an even greater intrusion on the natural
scene?
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Two more villages are scheduled for the park: Grant
Village, to be even larger than Canyon Village, at the west
side of Yellowstone Lake; and Firehole Village, near Old
Faithful.
One thing leads to another: Up to now, the Park Service
and the concessioner have supplied the park's electricity with
thirty diesel-powered generators. Because of the expansion,
commercial power, says the service, has become a necessity;
and as this is written, Yellowstone's forests are being cut to
make way for power lines, many miles of them—further marring
the park's beauty.
Yellowstone was our first national park, established by
Act of Congress in 1872. It was made accessible during the
stagecoach era. Long distances and slow travel required that
hotels and camps be located at the end of each day's journey.
Today, smooth roads and fast automobiles do away with the
necessity to stay in the park overnight; yet the National
Park Service still administers it as though we were living in
the old days.
Darling and Eichhorn (1969) were also very critical of Mission 66
developments in Yellowstone:
Canyon Village is another seasonal community which covers
large acreage and is difficult to justify in its present
position. It could just as well have been outside the park
and would have played a larger part in the economy of the
state of Wyoming. In addition to a large plaza with
supermarket and gift stores and art shop, there are 1,500
duplex cabins where one can distinctly hear his neighbor
breathing in sleep, though this is the pleasantest sound to
come through the flimsy walls. Our stay there conveyed to us
none of what we have heard called the national park
experience; or perhaps this is the modern national park
experience,... Some would justify the existence of Canyon
Village because of its proximity to points of high scenic
value in the park. We would take the view that this is a
prime reason why Canyon Village should not be there.
The same objections apply to trailer camps and automobile
camps. They could be outside the park. The trees have
completely disappeared from parts of that national park slum
called Fishing Bridge; many trees were felled to make the
large new trailer and automobile camp at Grant Village, where
the rest of the trees are blowing down through lack of support
and shelter by their fellows. The very term "village"
indicates the present dangerous trend of thinking in national
parks. We were in Grant Village just before its dedication

Page 94

and were depressed by the sense of dereliction already
palpable, for the village was by then occupied.
After the end of the M66 program, the NPS began a new master plan
process. The new master plan process was a re-adjustment of Mission 66
(Anderson, pers. comm.), no doubt in response to critics such as those
previously quoted. The Director established a study team to develop a
regional master plan for Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks.
The team consisted of Yellowstone Superintendent John McLaughlin and
Grand Teton Superintendent Jack Anderson (who later replaced McLaughlin
as Yellowstone Superintendent), as well as a representative of the NPS
Denver Field Office, the Midwest Regional Associate Director,
representatives of the Izaak Walton League and the Wildlife Management
Institute, a consultant from Salt Lake City, and Sigurd Olson, a
naturalist and writer, referred to as a NPS collaborator (Hartzog memo,
undated).
The study team faced several controversial issues. Among the key
issues the team dealt with were: the amount of the Park to be
designated as wilderness under the Wilderness Act; the idea of building
bypass roads around high concentration areas such as Lake, Old Faithful,
and West Thumb; the concept of removing or limiting overnight
accommodations within the Park; the installation of a mass transit
system in the Park; the elimination of inappropriate facilities or
services; and the problem of Grant Village (Anderson, pers. comm.).
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Public hearings held in surrounding communities in 1972 brought out
various opinions about the proposed master plan. In Livingston, MT,
concessioners complained that they had not been conslulted in the
planning process and that a mass transit system would be too costly,
while conservation groups present advocated removal of overnight
facilities (Billings Gazette, 1972). The Denver Post (Wynkoop, 1972)
proclaimed that Mission 66 was "dead", and that at the hearing in
Jackson, WY, the new master plan proposals emphasized preservation.
According to the Post the Governor of Wyoming and state and civic
business leaders did not like the plan's preservation orientation and
its "new direction" for the Park. They felt that the Wyoming tourism
industry was at stake, and objected to what they perceived as proposals
to restrict automobile use in the Park. Most chambers of commerce in
surrounding communities favored the completion of Grant Village
(Anderson, pers. comm.), possibly because they felt that having more
facilities within the Park would help draw more tourists to the region.
Meanwhile, the Park Service was planning for Yellowstone's
centennial that same year, and the Park became the subject of much
public debate over what was wrong with the Park and what should be done
to preserve it for another century. In Billings, MT, a Montana
Congressman called for development of the Park's "fringe areas" and
attacked YPCO for allowing the facilities within the Park to deteriorate
(Sullivan, 1972). Huser (1972) argued that, as had been historically
true, the three states surrounding the Park were pushing for more use,
although the Park had reached a point of overuse. Huser favored
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restricting automobile use and developing a mass transit system.
In 1973, the final version of the Yellowstone Master Plan (YMP) was
completed, and a year later it was approved (NPS Advisory Board (1),
undated). The new master plan (USDI, 1974) was different from previous
plans; instead of being a detailed document that specifically
identified future plans and development, it was a "conceptual document"
which outlined in broad terms the future direction of the Park's
management (Barbee, pers. comm.) It was not intended to tie the NPS
down to specific actions, but rather was intended to provide general
guidance under which there was much opportunity for change (Barbee,
pers. comm.). The new master plan left a substantial amount of
discretion to future administrators, and was intended to provide for
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
which mandated federal agencies to give opportunities for public
involvement in planning and to determine environmental consequences of
potential management actions.
The new Yellowstone Master Plan reflected the attitudes prevalent
at the time. It was written during the environmental revolution and
restated the "preservation and use" mandate of the Service "in terms of
contemporary connotations" (USDI, 1974):
To perpetuate the natural ecosystems within the park iji
as near pristine conditions as possible for their
inspirational» educational, cultural, and scientific values
for this and future generations.
The YMP called for regional planning with the US Forest Service, state
agencies, and surrounding communities. It perpetuated the M66 concept
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of removing roads and facilities from fragile and impacted areas, but
the final plan did not call for the installation of a mass transit
system or a one-way traffic system on the lower-loop road as had been
proposed. It also "backed off" from calling for the removal of all
overnight facilities within the Park, but instead called for a ceiling
of 8,300 pillows (total overnight guest capacity in cabins, hotels, and
trailer parks, but excluding campgrounds) within the Park (Anderson,
pers. comm.) and development of the gateway communities surrounding the
Park's to provide accommodations for increasing numbers of park
visitors. The Master Plan stated that with guest ceilings established
within the Park:
Ultimately freed from having to provide the mass terminal
creature-comfort facilities and services within its prime
resource zone, Yellowstone National Park can begin to expand
its interpretive,educational, and environmental functions.
Anderson had of course favored no further development at Grant Village,
but was outvoted by other members of the study team, as well as by the
Director (Anderson, pers. comm.). However, rather than perpetuating
the Mission 66 plan of constructing Grant as part of the triad of Canyon
Village, Firehole Village, and Grant Village to replace facilities
removed from the Canyon rim, Old Faithful, and West Thumb, respectively,
the new Master Plan advocated completion of Grant as an immediate
replacement of West Thumb and a future replacement for overnight
facilities at Old Faithful and Fishing Bridge (to be removed when the
situation permitted). Therefore, because Grant Village had already been
partially constructed at considerable expense to the federal government,
rather than abandoning the project as part of obsolete planning the
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Master Plan attempted to adapt the project to help achieve the new goals
of limiting overnight use and rehabilitating impacted areas. The desire
to remove facilities from Fishing Bridge came about because of
recognition of the importance of the area around the Lake outlet as
grizzly bear habitat.
THE 1976 YELLOWSTONE CONCESSIONS STUDY
When the Master Plan was approved in 1974, the Grant Village
project was at essentially the same standstill it had been in 1969.
Although the marina, visitor center, and gas station were open to the
public, there was still no lodging facilities built and little chance of
YPCO building any in the foreseeable future. Then, in 1975 John
Townsley replaced Anderson as Superintendent, and was sent to the Park
with "pretty specific directions" from the Director to find a solution
to concessioner problems (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). By this time the
Service was not only upset by General Host's refusal to fulfill its
contractual agreement to build Grant Village, but also by the numbers of
complaints about poor service from visitors and from surrounding
communities whose economies are dependent upon Park visitation (Anzelmo,
pers. comm.).
The Service established a study team in 1976 to conduct an
extensive review of YPCO (USDI, 1976). The study team's report (USDI,
1976) was harshly critical of almost every aspect of the company's
operation; their findings were quite similar to those of Dr. Wilson's
study of the old YPCO thirteen years earlier. Among the basic comments
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of the 1976 review:
Management in the Yellowstone Park Company is fragmented,
lacks sufficient experience in operations, and, therefore,
does not respond adequately or consistently to visitor needs.
The management cannot respond to visitor needs because the
company is not oriented to service to the public, but only to
the generation of profit dollars.
Currently, executive bonuses are being paid at an increasing
rate, presumably as a reward for the production of increased
profits, while the services and facilities being provided in
the park are deteriorating. The company reacts only to
pressure, and cannot seem to work out long-range solutions to
its problems. There is a reasonable profit generated by the
company, not because of good service or quality facilities,
but because of the thousands of visitors who enter Yellowstone
National Park and have no other place to eat or sleep.
Without a captive audience, and in a competitive situation
outside of the park environment, the company could not survive
as it is presently constituted.
The seasonal employees of the Yellowstone Park Company are not
treated equitably. They are paid low wages, work long hours,
are housed in inadequate quarters, are not properly trained,
have poor supervision, are fed unprofessionally prepared food
in unpleasant, unclean staffeterias, and do not have
supervisory or managerial support in their daily work....
Food service is usually slow, and employees are not aware of,
or responsive to, basic needs. Sanitation standards are below
the standards of many public health departments and large
hospitality companies....
Lodging in the park is characterized by slow service at the
front desk and poorly furnished, ill-maintained sleeping
quarters....There are no apparent standards for maid service.
Generally, the lodging facilities are poorly decorated, poorly
furnished and equipped, poorly lighted, poorly cleaned, poorly
heated and insulated, and merely tolerated by the typical park
visitor....
Most facilities throughout the park show extensive signs of
advanced age and improper maintenance....
In short, the Yellowstone Park Company is providing to the
visitor unacceptable facilities and services. These problems
cannot be solved with the current management structure,
attitude, and emphasis. The company, if it continues to exist
in Yellowstone, must undergo a complete overhaul, both in
management philosophy and structure, and in facilities and
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facility presentation.
The study team admitted that "in light of existing developed areas in
the park, it is not economically feasible for the concessioner to
develop Grant Village", and therefore recommended that the NPS "purchase
the possessory interest in all concession-owned buildings at Grant
Village", begin building "low-cost shelter units, cottages, public
buildings, and related site work", and lease back all, or part, of the
facilities to a concessioner. The study team held the positions that:
The Yellowstone Park Company and its owners, the General Host
Corporation, have not met their contractual commitments with
respect to facility development.
The development of new facilities at Grant Village should be
the responsibility of the Government.
The contract, without renewal, expires on September 30, 1977,
due to non-compliance by the concessioner.
The National Park Service is willing to extend the contract
for an additional twenty years...if the concessioner and the
parent corporation will agree to the renovation program and
the managerial and operational improvements specified in this
report.
The company is in violation of its contract by giving
unsatisfactory service.
The development to be built by the government, as proposed by the study
team, was to consist of "400 lodging units, a restaurant, concessioner
dormitories, utilities roads and related development at a net cost of
$14,782,000" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated).
By 1979 the Park Service, citing poor service to the public and
failure to develop Grant, finally convinced Congress to appropriate
$19.9 million for government purchase of the facilities owned by General
Host, and thus eliminated their possessory interest (Anzelmo, pers.
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comm.)* General Host lost their lease at the end of the 1979 summer
season, and a subsidiary of Trans World Airlines, TWA Services, was
granted a two-year interim contract for the concessions.
THE GRANT VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PLAN
Also in 1979, in accordance with NEPA, the NPS issued the
Environmental Assessment and Preferred Alternative for the Grant Village
Development Concept Plan (USDI, 1979). The Preferred Alternative cited
Grant Village as the solution of "two pressing problems" in Yellowstone,
the "removal of development from environmentally sensitive areas", and
"management of traffic on the Grand Loop Road". The Preferred
Alternative called for:
Locating 700 new lodging units at Grant Village [which] is
intended to compensate for overnight accommodations removed
from West Thumb and to allow the eventual removal of lodging
from Fishing Bridge and Old Faithful,...
The Plan called for multiunit buildings, with a maximum of 100 units per
building and interior access to individual rooms. The buildings were
not to be higher than three stories, and each room was to have at least
a half-bath. Construction was to be carried out in phases. Phase 1A
was to consist of construction of 100 to 200 units, and had already been
planned prior to the writing of the preferred alternative. The rest of
Phase 1 was to be the construction of employee dormitories, roads and
parking, and a restaurant. Phase 2 was to consist of upgrading the
sewage system. Phase 3 was to be construction of 200 more lodging
units, a second restaurant, and support facilities. Phase 4 was the
construction of 200 to 300 more lodging units. The Park Service was to
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"pay all costs and...make new facilities available to the concessioner
at no expense to them". Thus the Service, in order to complete the
project, was willing to construct the facilities with federal money.
This proposal alleviated the concessioner complaint that construction
and maintenance costs made Grant Village unfeasible. It should be noted
that the units called for were no longer a variety of cabins ranging
from luxury to shelter, but were to be multiunit buildings with each
room having some bath facilities.
The Plan stated that "[t]he primary interpretive theme at Grant
Village will continue to be the wilderness threshold experience". Grant
Village was to be a starting point for those wishing to hike out into
the southern backcountry of the Park. However, the US Fish and Wildlife
Service, in their biological opinion of the Preferred Alternative,
expressed concern for the impact the completion of Grant Village would
have on the grizzly bear. Five cutthroat trout spawning streams flow
through the developed area, and bears had traditionally frequented the
area in spring in search of trout. The Fish and Wildlife Service
stated:
It is our biological opinion that the proposed development
within Grant Village is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the grizzly bear. However, we question the need
and justification for such extensive commercial development
within occupied grizzly habitat and believe that adverse
impacts to the bear will result, although they may be at a
level that does not constitute jeopardy to the species. We
also believe the project will negate many of the benefits
acquired through the phaseout of facilities at Fishing Bridge
and view such a "trade-off" as an unfavorable solution to a
wildlife conflict that, with development of Grant Village,
will likely be duplicated rather than eliminated (USDI, 1979).
Dr. Richard Knight, head of the Interagency Grizzly Study Team which is
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responsible for grizzly research in the Yellowstone ecosystem, was
vehemently critical of both the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park
Service. He is quoted as stating (McNamee, 1982):
^ [T]he habitat encroachment is always considered by the
Fish and Wildlife Service item by item. They're always
saying, no, this won't jeopardize the bear by itself. But
what about the cumulative effect of five or six developments?
They won't address that. Yellowstone Village is a big real
estate development right in the middle of where there used to
be lots of bears. Then you've got Ski Yellowstone, and that
by itself wouldn't wipe out the bears— just take a few more.
And right here in the park, twenty to twenty-eight million
dollars' worth of development at Grant Village is coming,
sitting on top of five Yellowstone Lake spawning
streams—some of the most heavily used grizzly habitat we've
got.
In August 1980 a meeting was held at Grant Village including the
NPS Director, the Rocky Mountain Regional Director, and Superintendent
Townsley and members of his staff (Wenk, pers. comm.). According to
Wenk, the meeting was deemed necessary because approval for the
completion of the Village was required at only the regional level, but
because of its controversial nature it was decided that the Director
should be fully informed about the project. At the meeting the Director
gave his commitment to the development. The primary interest groups
concerned about Grant Village at this time, besides those worried about
the bear population, were motel owners in surrounding communities who,
after a "disasterous" 1979 season, were now concerned that the Park
Service was creating competition at Grant (Wenk, pers. comm.).
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The NPS began construction of the first phase (two 50 unit
buildings), but with the election of a new president came new attempts
to reduce federal spending. In compliance with that policy, Secretary
of the Interior Watt ordered that no more federal money be spent on
development in the national parks, and thus the Grant Village project
had another setback (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). Superintendent Townsley
flew to Washington, DC, in an effort to find a way to complete the
development; he had a strong personal commitment to the project, to the
extent that its completion became "an obsession" with him, although he
was unpopular with many of his field employees because of his commitment
(Anzelmo, pers. comm.).
The end result of the Secretary's decision and Townsley's efforts
was a plan for the concessioner to finance construction of the remaining
facilities at Grant with a percentage of their gross revenues. TWA
Services outbid other corporations for the long-term contract (five
years with a five year renewal option) by promising to re-invest 22 per
cent of their gross revenues into a maintenance and improvement fund
which would be used for facility rehabilitation and construction at
Grant Village (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). TWA advanced seven million
dollars toward the construction of Grant, which will be credited to the
22 per cent fund (Wenk, pers. comm.). Should TWA's lease not be
renewed, they will leave the Park with no possessory interest (Anzelmo,
pers. comm.).
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TWA is presently constructing four 50 unit buildings and a
restaurant that will complete their part of the contractual agreement.
For its part, the Park Service is attempting to get appropriations for
the rehabilitation of the Grant Village marina. It has been closed
since 1980 because wind and rough water so severely damaged the docks
that they had to be removed. TWA is pushing for the reopening of the
marina, feeling that it is an important factor in keeping occupancy
levels up at the new development (King, pers. comm.). The Park Service
hopes to reopen the marina in 1985 or 1986 (Wenk, pers. comm.).
There has been considerable adverse comment on the architectual
style of the Grant Village lodging facilities. People often refer to
them as "condos" and have asked why the NPS did not have rustic
buildings or cabins built. Wenk (pers. comm.) states that the decision
was a matter of economics; the Park Service had to settle for the least
expensive buildings, which then would cost the Park visitor less to stay
in.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF WEST THUMB, OLD FAITHFUL, AND FISHING BRIDGE
The development of Grant Village is predicated on the removal of
facilities at West Thumb and Fishing Bridge, and the cabins at Old
Faithful. In order for the project to comply with the intent of the
1973 Master Plan, that tradeoff must occur. Jack Anderson, who was
never a strong advocate of the project, feels that removal of all the
intended facilities is necessary to make Grant an acceptable development
(Anderson, pers. comm.). Dan Wenk, the current Landscape Architect for
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the NPS in Yellowstone, expressed his personal opinion:
Grant Village is the right move only if three things
happen: that we can continue to get out of Old Faithful, we
continue to get out of West Thumb, and we continue to get out
of Fishing Bridge. If those three things don't happen, then
it's a giant mistake. (Wenk, pers. comm.)
Therefore, with so much importance being placed on Grant Village as only
a part of an overall effort on the part of the Park Service to
dramatically change the overnight use of the Park, it is important to
examine the current status of the three developments involved in the
Grant Village tradeoff.
The facilities at West Thumb are to be removed in the Fall of 1984,
but Hamilton Stores wants to keep their store open there until all 700
units are built at Grant Village (Wenk, pers. comm.). The NPS has not
made a decision about that store at this time. Further development at
Grant will probably not occur until a new concession contract is
negotiated after the current one expires in ten years (Wenk, pers.
comm.). Thus, if Hamilton is allowed to keep the store at West Thumb
until Grant is complete, it will be open for several more years.
After issuing an environmental assessment and holding public
hearings to discuss alternatives as part of the NEPA process, the Park
Service issued a draft Development Concept Plan for Old Faithful in
February 1984. The Plan called for removing several facilities from the
Old Faithful area, including all cabins (USDI, 1984). Most of the
cabins are scheduled to be removed at the end of the 1984 season (King,
pers. comm.); those needed for employee housing will remain until new
housing can be provided in the employee housing area (Wenk, pers.
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comm.). The cabin removal is essentially a one-to-one tradeoff for the
opening of lodging facilities at Grant; 326 cabins for 300 new units
(Wenk, pers. comm.). Opposition to the cabin removal comes primarily
from historic preservation groups who claim that the cabins have
historic value, and from members of the public who believe the
traditional experience of staying in the Old Faithful cabins is one
which should be perpetuated (Wenk, pers. comm.). Concessioners are
interested to the extent that they feel a segment of the public will no
longer have their interests served, but they do not really consider the
Old Faithful cabins an issue (Wenk, pers. comm.).
Presently the Park Service is developing a Lake Area Development
Concept Plan. In the summer of 1983 several public meetings (termed
"workshops" by the NPS) were held in the Park and in surrounding
communities. At those workshops, NPS representatives presented
alternatives for future planning for the Lake-Fishing Bridge-Bridge Bay
area. The alternatives dealt with several issues: removal of some
facilities, building new facilities, relocating some facilities, and
building new roads and closing others. However, the most important
issue at those workshops seemed to be the future of the recreational
vehicle campground at Fishing Bridge. The workshops were very biased
(Barbee, pers. comm.), with the recreational vehicle constituency and
Hamilton Stores usually heavily represented. As far as the RV group was
concerned, the issue is one of having RV camping facilities within
Yellowstone Park. Many preferred that the existing RV campground remain
at Fishing Bridge, but their main concern was that the facilities be
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present somewhere within the Park (Wenk, pers. comm.). They strongly
opposed what they felt were NPS efforts to force them to stay in the
"condos" at Grant in order to benefit TWA Services. Hamilton Stores is
interested in the RV park because their store at Fishing Bridge is
dependent on the people who stay there. Even if the NPS were to allow
Hamilton to keep the store there, without the RV park profits at the
store would suffer considerably. The other concessioner, TWA Services,
wrote to members of Congress in the context of speaking for the public
interest suggesting that the RV park at Fishing Bridge was a service
which, if eliminated, would deprive certain members of the public of the
experience they desired in Yellowstone (Wenk, pers. comm.). The RV
constituency is represented by regional and national recreational
vehicle organizations such as the Good Sam Club. These organizations
have worked at the national level to protect their constituents'
interests.
At a workshop in Cody, WY, Hamilton Stores was again wellrepresented. Also, the business community of Cody firmly believes that
the facilities at Fishing Bridge are essential to their economy. The
highway through Cody continues through Yellowstone's east entrance and
leads directly to Fishing Bridge; people in Cody feel that the Fishing
Bridge development is a primary reason for tourists to enter the Park
from the east entrance, and that removal of the facilities will "destroy
the economic viability of their tourist trade" (Wenk, pers. comm.). US
Senator Alan Simpson is from Cody (Wenk, pers. comm.) and therefore
provides a sympathetic ear in the senate for the people of Cody.
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Environmental groups, on the other hand, have been supportive of
the NPS proposal at Fishing Bridge. The plight of the grizzly bear
population in Yellowstone has become a highly visible issue in the
popular media recently, and environmentalists feel that returning the
Fishing Bridge area to its natural condition is important to the
survival of the bear in the Yellowstone ecosystem.
Because of the "intense" interest on the part of the public,
special interest groups, and Congressional delegations, who "brought a
lot of pressure" on the Park Service, the Service in conjunction with
the Fish and Wildlife Service reviewed the data that led to the Fishing
Bridge decision, and presented the findings to the Director, who then
made the final decision to remove the facilities (Wenk, pers. comm.).
The review was essentially an attempt to provide a sound basis for the
Park Service's argument that the Fishing Bridge area is extremely
important habitat for the Yellowstone grizzly bear population.
The end result of the debate could have been that both Fishing
Bridge and Grant Village would have remained as operating locations.
Because of strong opinions on both sides of the issue the final decision
was probably based more on political considerations then on biological
evidence (Wenk, pers. comm.).
Robert Barbee succeeded the late John Townsley as Yellowstone
Superintendent in 1983. As Wenk (pers. comm.) stated, Barbee "arrived
for the last scene of the last act of the play" at Grant Village.
Barbee (pers. comm.) stated his thoughts on the development: "I'm not

Page 110

an apologist for Grant Village. I'm accepting that it's there. It
offers us the opportunity to do some things that the Service has wanted
to accomplish." He was referring to the removal of facilities at Fishing
Bridge, Old Faithful, and West Thumb; the decisions made concerning
those facilities will ultimately be one which he will have to deal with,
and because of their controversial nature, he will undoubtedly draw the
wrath of the special interest groups that disagree with that decision.

CHAPTER FOUR:
CONCLUSIONS
THE MERITS OF GRANT VILLAGE
Upon superficial examination the Grant Village development today
seems to be an outdated response to visitation demands in Yellowstone
Park, and unfortunately, too many people have based their arguments
against the development on such examination. Closer study of the
project makes the complexity of the issues surrounding it more apparent
and clarifies the purpose the development is supposed to serve.
The project was begun in an era of extreme anthropocentric
philosophy in the National Park Service, and has survived throughout
years of relatively dramatic change in the Service's philosophy toward
biocentrism. The Leopold Report of 1963 served to steer the Service
toward a biocentric course, but the marinas at Grant and Bridge Bay,
which the Report stated were inconsistent with the purpose of national
parks, were already under construction when the Report was published.
The Report therefore had little direct impact on the project, but it and
subsequent post-Mission 66 studies, reports, and articles (such as the
Darling-Eichhorn study sponsored by the Conservation Foundation) did
serve to help lead national park policy away from the anthropocentrism
that dominated M66. The master plan process instituted by the NPS in
the mid-1960s was in a part a response to those efforts; the process
was conceived as a re-adjustment of M66 planning to bring it more in
line with biocentric goals, and the Yellowstone Master Plan that
111
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resulted from that process reflected many of the changing attitudes
toward the national parks that had arisen during the environmental
revolution. Instead of trying to accommodate increasing recreational
use of the parks, the new Master Plan sought to place a limit on the
number of overnight accommodations, and therefore reflected the newly
popular belief that national parks, like the Earth's environment, had a
limit to the amount of use they could withstand without being destroyed.
The Master Plan changed Grant Village from being one part of a
triad of major visitor facilities developments planned during M66 to
replace and expand facilities located in fragile or impacted areas to
being a replacement for facilities at three impacted areas. Grant was
seen as a way to help reduce impacts at three important areas by
relocating equivalent facilities without impacting an additional
pristine area.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to find anyone in the Park
Service in Yellowstone today who is fond of the massive, urban-looking
development at Canyon Village, and it is doubtful that many feel more
charitable toward the development at Grant. But as Superintendent
Barbee suggested, it does offer the Service the opportunity to
accomplish some desired goals. Removal of all overnight facilities in
Yellowstone was not politically feasible when the new Master Plan was
written, and is not feasible today. Given that fact, a compromise
tradeoff to get facilities removed from some fragile areas was probably
the only way to eliminate impacts caused by overnight use at those
areas. Although the merits of the tradeoff can be questioned on several
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grounds, particularly the grizzly issue, Grant Village was probably the
only resolution to several conflicts (including the bears, visitor
impacts on fragile areas, improvement of visitor facilities) that was
economically and politically viable. In the long term, should the
political climate change so that overnight facilities could be further
reduced within the Park, and should the NPS desire to do so, Grant
Village could be reduced or eliminated much more easily than could
several developments. Thus, Grant Village could serve as an
intermediate stage in a long term effort to remove overnight facilities
from the Park.
Therefore, while Grant is seen by many to be incorporating an
outdated management philosophy that was rejected several years earlier,
it can be viewed as an attempt by the NPS to bring Yellowstone Park
planning more in line, within political constraints, with the broad
biocentric goals of national park policy by using an area already
partially developed under the anthropocentric philosophy to accomplish
some biocentric objectives. Hence, the Grant Village plan today must be
looked at as part of an overall effort to bring the Park's management
more in line with the current biocentric management philosophy, and
within that context the development does have beneficial aspects for the
Yellowstone ecosystem.
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THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF GRANT VILLAGE
Grant Village has several negative aspects which help make the
project controversial, and also limit its value as a tradeoff for
biocentric purposes. One negative aspect which has plagued the project
from its inception is its poor location. Haines (pers. comm.) stated
that, had the planning remained at the Park level instead of being taken
over by the Service's Western Office of Design and Construction,
development would not have been at the present location. Haines felt
the present location was a bad choice because the area gets little sun,
has cold, damp nights, and water circulation in the Thumb area of the
Lake is poor, resulting in a danger of water pollution in the Village's
water supply, as well as the Lake itself. Anderson (pers. comm.) also
cited several reasons that he felt the location was poor:
I felt that Grant Village was a mistake from the
standpoint of a developed area. Number one, it is infested
with mosquitoes half of the summer. Number two, it is the
highest snow load area in the park, literally; it is the
first to close, the last to open. You're sitting in a bog
down there. It was also...historically a grizzly breeding
area....It isn't an area...where you want to take your family
and stay a week or two.
Garrison stated that Grant Village was planned as a "wilderness
takeoff point" and would be a starting point for canoe trips on
Yellowstone Lake, but anyone familiar with the West Thumb of the lake
knows that wind makes it too rough for canoes practically every day of
the summer. Also, if the primary clientele was to be canoeists, clearly
the elaborate marina that exists today would not have been built. Wind
and wave damage to the marina's docks caused its closure in 1980, which
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is further evidence that the site for the Village was poorly chosen, but
both the NPS and TWA consider the marina important to attract visitors
to the development. Hence, at a time when the Park Service would seem
to have an opportunity to make Yellowstone management more in line with
the policies of the Leopold Report, it is continuing to perpetuate
Mission 66-type activities by rehabilitating the Grant Village marina.
The bear issue is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Grant
Village. The lack of enthusiasm expressed by the Fish and Wildlife
Service and Dr. Knight for the Fishing Bridge tradeoff cause one to
question how much the bears will actually benefit. Certainly the worst
possibility as far as the bear population is concerned would be for both
Fishing Bridge and Grant to provide overnight accommodations.
THE BIOCENTRIC ARGUMENT
In studying the Grant Village project it becomes apparent that
local and regional interests have assumed a very important role in the
Yellowstone Park policy process, and in some instances have forced
compromises and tradeoffs which have prevented Park policies from fully
complying with the stated goals of park policy at the national level.
The regional economic interests are especially powerful. Their power is
due to the fact that the economy of a three-state region is extensively
dependent on Park visitation. Regional non-economic interests are also
powerful, as are Park concessioners, who are no longer small family-run
operations, but are now corporate enterprises.
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Because these interest groups generally desire increased Park
visitation, or at least are against restrictions on what they consider
desirable uses, their arguments can be placed in the anthropocentric end
of the management spectrum, and they have a fairly viable foundation in
law and tradition for their anthropocentric arguments. Yellowstone was
established for essentially anthropocentric reasons, and early tourists
were largely wealthy Easterners seeking the luxury of the portal
experience. The first NPS director freely encouraged anthropocentric
uses of the parks, and played a major role in the construction of luxury
hotels which catered to the portal tourist. The Mission 66 program was
an anthropocentric answer to the post-World War II recreation boom; the
facilities built during that program will continue to exist for several
years, and by their presence and use will perpetuate the convenienceoriented types of use which reflect anthropocentric ideals. The
Concessions Policy Act of 1965 gave legal strength to the concessioners'
anthropocentrism by putting responsibility for their opportunity to
realize profits on the Park Service. Under the current presidential
administration anthropocentric management has received important support
from the Interior Department, with the Secretary offering his sympathies
to concessioner interests. Thus, the anthropocentric argument is fairly
strong.
However, the biocentric argument is much stronger; it has its
basis in several laws dealing with the parks, as well as in the
philosophy of the preservation movement that grew in this century,
reached a peak during the environmental revolution of the 1970s, and has
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been an essential factor in the evolution of national park policy. The
legal basis began with the Yellowstone Act of 1872 which included the
biocentric goal of preserving all "natural curiosities...in their
natural condition". The National Park Service Act of 1916 also had the
biocentric goal to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and the wildlife", and the Lane Letter went further by
establishing as the first goal of the Service "that the national parks
must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form". That statement
perhaps best expresses the biocentric basis of the first NPS director's
philosophy. The Leopold Report of 1963 became undoubtedly the most
concise biocentric statement of policy to this day. It refuted the
anthropocentric answer to the post-war crush of park visitors, and made
it clear that, as Haines (pers. comm.) stated, the M66 planners'
"crystal ball was off" when they tried to plan for future management of
the parks.
The biocentric philosophy for national park management has also
enjoyed a growing popular support. The first suggestions for
establishment of national parks were essentially biocentric, although at
the time they did not generate public interest. By the late nineteenth
century, however, Olmsted helped popularize biocentric management when
he stated that parks should be maintained in as natural condition as
possible with only necessary, unobtrusive visitor facilities provided.
He believed that facilities and services provided within parks should
not be attractions in themselves. In the early twentieth century John
Muir generated a great deal of public support for the biocentric park
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philosophy, and when the environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s
arose, his writings enjoyed a renewed popularity. Several writers of
that revolution, such as Edward Abbey, wrote strongly of the need for
biocentric management, and their ideas were widely accepted. In the
1980s, Sax has spoken eloquently for the need for park visitors to enjoy
the parks unrestrained by conventional services provided by
concessioners. He advocated the elimination of "resort"-style
convenience-oriented recreation in the parks.
It can be argued that the biocentrism which grew to dominate
national park policy in the late 1960s is only a phase which was popular
during the enviromental revolution but is coming to an end in this era
of "new conservatism". Perhaps James Watt did signal the beginning of
an era when the American people will favor maximum resource development
and reject preservationist biocentric ideals as incompatible with the
needs of modern American society. That prospect seems highly unlikely
because the biocentric philosophy that exists within the National Park
Service policy today arose out of the preservationist ideas first voiced
in the United States over 150 years ago, and the preservation movement
has grown since then as American society has progressed. The movement
grew in the late nineteenth century because the public began to realize
that the continent's natural resources are finite, and came of age when
science came to more fully understand the ecological interdependence of
all living things. For the national parks, the implication is that park
visitors, instead of merely enjoying the parks as portal tourists, will
become more sensitive to ecological problems created by altering the
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park environment. They will be more aware that actions which affect one
aspect of a park may have undesirable impacts on other aspects which may
be considered essential to the park experience; therefore the
biocentric philosophy, which emphasizes the maintenance of naturally
occurring environmental processes, is most likely to be desired by more
park visitors in the future.
While the Third Wave theory does not deal with biocentrism or
anthropocentrism in leisure activities, it does tend to support the idea
that biocentric recreation will continue to gain in popularity. The
portal tourism prevalent in the past century is emblematic of the
structured, convenience- and entertainment- oriented recreation of the
Second Wave. The contemplative, educational, and self-actualizing forms
of recreation favored by biocentrists are emblematic of the Third Wave.
Hence, for those who subscribe to Toffler's theory, the biocentric
argument for national parks would seem to be the most farsighted.
IDEALISM VS. REALISM
Many may contend that the Leopold Report was not meant to be given
the importance it has been given in this paper. Some would assert that
it is only a broad guideline for national park management. Others would
argue that it was meant to deal only with resource issues. However, the
authors of the Report clearly felt that recreational issues cannot be
separated from resource issues. The significant contribution of the
Report was that it stressed the concept of integrated park management,
and that the goal of providing recreational opportunities should be
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subordinate to preserving ecosystems. It is the Report's emphasis on
preserving ecosystems that makes it powerful because that makes
management consider more than just insuring that visitors can see
unspoiled scenery; it must insure that visitor use will not disrupt the
natural system.
The goals of the Leopold Report are ideals the Service was directed
to seek to achieve, but as both former Superintendent Anderson and
present Superintendent Barbee stated, "Sometimes you have to be a
realist" (pers. coirans.). The national parks are a highly visible,
extremely popular institution in American culture which also have
significant economic value to several interest groups. Thus, decisions
made in the parks, especially a Park as famous as Yellowstone, are
invariably very political. As Barbee (pers. comm.) stated:
^ [I]n every national park there is a constellation of
i'
special interest groups that surround it...there are certain
traditional kinds of uses that exist there that one more or
less accepts as part of the picture. They don't seem to
' ^ v%
materially affect the entire park and so one has to ask the
questions: How far do you want to go? How pure do you want
to get? At what cost do you want to pursue that, politically
and so on?
Many of these special interests are not concerned with the philosophical
basis for policy formation, be it anthropocentric or biocentric, but are
only concerned with how the implementation of various policies will
affect them. This fact makes these interests especially difficult for
the NPS to deal with because they are unwilling to look at the overall
goals of national park management.
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Included in this type of special interests are individuals and
groups who regularly patronize a particular park and, because of their
political connections, are able to either change policy or prevent its
implementation, at least to the extent that it would affect them and
their activities. Because of the difficulty in identifying them and
measuring their influence on the policy process they are beyond the
scope of this study. Nevertheless they do exist, and anyone familiar
with Yellowstone can identify some of them; for although their power is
informal, they are well-known to Park employees, are treated with
deference, and are often allowed special privileges or considerations.
For examples of this type of special interest, one could study Bridge
Bay Marina, where several wealthy people, primarily from the surrounding
region, rent summer-long dock space season after season; many of them
live on their boats for the entire season, which tends to give the
marina the atmosphere of a private yacht club. Some of these people are
friends of state or national politicians, and are very vocal about
fishing and boating restrictions on the Lake. The degree to which these
people have an effect on Park policy in any important sense is quite
difficult to determine, but the fact that they do have an effect is very
important to recognize in order to understand the realities of national
park management.
Congress, in the Concessions Policy Act, allowed for these
political considerations when it failed to define "necessary and
appropriate" facilities and services in national parks. Consequently,
those terms are usually defined on a case-by-case basis in the political
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arena. Because of the political power of the special interests, the
Park Service is placed in a position of seeking compromises, which some
refer to as "the balance of preservation and use". However, that label
implies that preservationists are opposed to any use, which is not the
case. Preservation interests only seek to narrow the definition of the
purpose of the parks to in order to exclude what they consider
inappropriate uses. The balance is actually between those interests
favoring a narrow set of biocentric uses and those favoring a wide range
of uses, including anthropocentric uses.
COMPROMISES IN BIOCENTRIC MANAGEMENT
In theory the preservationists and the Park Service are on the
biocentric side, but in reality, because of its vague legal direction
and the power of the anthropocentric interests, the NPS is more of a
mediator who tries to accommodate the wishes of both sides by striking
compromises between them in its management decisions. The tradeoff of
Fishing Bridge for Grant Village is one such compromise.
The contractual agreement between the NPS and TWA Services in
Yellowstone can also be viewed as a compromise between biocentric and
anthropocentric interests, and it is a compromise with dangerous
potential. The Park Service benefits from the agreement by insuring the
improvement of many of the Park's deteriorated facilities and the
construction of Grant Village which would then allow the achievement of
the biocentric goals of removing the facilities at Fishing Bridge, West
Thumb, and Old Faithful in order to restore impacted thermal areas and
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grizzly bear habitat. TWA benefits by having to re-invest only a
specified percentage of their revenues into these projects. However,
the agreement is a Catch-22. In order for the NPS to achieve its
desired biocentric goals, it must rely on capital provided by TWA.
Therefore, in order to guarantee enough capital to accomplish those
goals, the Service is in the position of helping TWA maximize profits.
TWA, in turn, pushes to expand the services it provides in order to
increase revenues. Frequently the Park Service is faced with allowing
TWA to provide anthropocentric services in order to accomplish
biocentric goals.
TWA's position as a concessioner and economic interest is perfectly
clear; they are in business in the Park to generate profits by serving
Park visitors. They cannot be expected to share either the Park
Service's point of view or its concern for biocentric management. They
have expressed their desire to increase tourism and make Yellowstone a
"destination resort" (Bozeman Chronicle, 1982), and have instituted such
attractions as live bands, gourmet dining, and fast food services. The
corporation also has a marketing division in the Park which promotes and
advertises the Park as a resort. TWA brochures advertise boat and horse
rides, fishing expeditions, and family cookouts in an effort to generate
more Park tourism. Perhaps, as Superintendent Barbee (pers. comm.)
suggested, such issues are relatively unimportant, and for the Service
"to get all bloodied up" politically over them would distract it from
more important things it is trying to accomplish. There is a
significant danger, however, that in allowing (or being forced to allow)
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such anthropocentrism within the Park, the NPS In Yellowstone is
actually being pulled further away from the biocentric goals stated at
the national level.
One example of TWA's anthropocentric intentions is the recent
renovation of Lake Hotel. The Hotel had been deteriorating for decades
and was badly in need of repair. In the fall of 1983 TWA began a 1.7
million dollar renovation project (Billings Gazette, 1984) with the
stated objective of bringing back the elegant tourist experience of the
late nineteenth century. The Billings Gazette (1984) paraphrased the
president of TWA Services, Yellowstone:
People may like to "rough it" on occasion, he said, but
hot dogs and campfires don't hack it when you feel like
getting fancy in a nice dress or suit and enjoying a meal of
lobster and pate topped off with cognac and classy
conversation.
At the gala opening two weekends ago, musicians played,
canapes were served and guests from all over the United States
mingled to enjoy raw oysters, filet, crab and strawberries
with champagne.
The Lake Hotel lobby today offers a beautiful and tasteful contrast
to the drab and shabby lobby of recent years, and by any standards is a
great improvement. The decor of the Hotel is not the issue; the issue
is the clientele TWA is seeking to attract. They are gearing much of
their operation toward visitors who are more interested in being
entertained in posh resort facilities surrounded by beautiful scenery
than in experiencing preserved ecosystems. With an operation such as
this the facilities and services provided become as much an attraction
as the Park itself, and are therefore incongruous with biocentric
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management.
Possibly the most disturbing evidence of the direction TWA seeks to
push Park management is a houseboat that, according to Wenk (pers.
comm.), TWA Services purchased with money from the maintenance and
improvement fund created by the contractual agreement with the NPS. The
boat offers the classic "portal" experience; it has plush furniture and
is fully carpeted, has a stereo system with outside speakers, has
cooking facilities and a bar, and comes equipped with fishing poles and
two guides. It is ostensibly for rent to Park visitors, but the rental
price is prohibitive to all but the most wealthy, and therefore it has
primarily been used as a pleasure boat for TWA executives and prominent
people TWA wishes to entertain; in the summer of 1983 at least one
congressman from a bordering state was treated to a complimentary day on
Yellowstone Lake. In essence, therefore, the boat is used by the
company as a tool with which to lobby for support for TWA initiatives in
Yellowstone. Such activity may have been considered appropriate in the
nineteenth century, but is inimical to today's biocentric management.
Furthermore, it subverts any Park Service effort to move away from
providing such convenience-oriented, mass recreation opportunities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
Examination of the evolution of national park policy and the
history of Grant Village points out two primary problems that greatly
affect the national parks' policy today: One, the vague legal basis
upon which policy is made. Two, the failure of the National Park
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Service to identify a clientele for whom it will seek to manage. The
second problem to a great extent follows from the first problem.
The vague legal basis. From the beginning of the national parks
Congress has been unwilling to form a concise legal basis for park
management. The reason is largely due to the fact that the parks were
not established as an organized system with a common purpose and policy,
but were established individually with individual management
prescriptions; a central management agency was not formed until after
several parks had been established, and it was given only a broad
mandate to both preserve the parks and provide for their use by the
public. Also, units established for recreational and historical
purposes were added to the system, further confusing management goals.
Early on the Park Service made every attempt to generate park use,
and these efforts were so successful that most of the major parks became
surrounded by communities dependent on park tourism. Because of the
strength these regional interests have gained as park visitation grew,
they have been very important in keeping tourism a major consideration
in park policy. Efforts by preservationist interests to strengthen the
preservation mandate of the Service have been frequently thwarted by
members of Congress sympathetic to these interests. Language in
national park legislation is generally broad enough to allow several
interpretations.
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If, as this paper has argued, the biocentric philosophy, which
stresses the importance of naturalness to the visitor, is the one which
best allows the Park Service to preserve the parks for future
generations and which will also provide the experience most desired by
park visitors is to be fully implemented by the NPS, Congress must give
it legal strength by more clearly defining proper park management. The
Leopold Report is the most concise statement of how the parks should be
managed, and Congress should give the principles expressed in the Report
legal strength.
The Choice of a Clientele. It has been recognized that
recreational use of any wildland area can reach a point where both the
resource and the experience of the recreationist are impaired; this
point has been termed the recreational carrying capacity of the area.
Thus, it follows that when this carrying capacity is in danger of being
exceeded, management must act to prevent impairment of the resource or
the recreational experience. One possible action is the establishment
of use limits, and the Leopold Report advocated use limits as a proper
management action when it stated, "If too many tourists crowd the
roadways, then we should ration the tourists rather than expand the
roadways". However, establishing carrying capacity and rationing use
are complex problems. As Shreyer (1979) stated, "Carrying capacity is a
tool to attain an outcome, rather than an inherent characteristic of a
recreation resource". Therefore, it "is a social cost imposed upon
society in order to attain other ends". Those ends may include
preservation of a desired recreational experience. Shreyer stated that
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applying recreational use limitations is actually a resource allocation
problem in which a certain desired clientele whose experiential goals
are most in line with management goals benefit from management actions,
while those whose goals are in opposition to management goals suffer.
The National Park Service has historically been unwilling or
unable, because of political pressures, to identify its desired
clientele. Shreyer (1976) claims that the Park Service suffers from two
"hang-ups": One, because the parks were established "for the benefit
and enjoyment of the people" (the Yellowstone Act of 1872) maximizing
visitors is considered by the Service to be equivalent to maximizing
benefits. Two, since the parks are for all people, visitors are treated
"as a vast, indistinguishable, amorphous mass" and the parks are managed
for everyone. He asserts that these hang-ups lead to what he referred
to as "lowest common denominator (LCD) management", which offers the
visitor the "most bland and least distinctive line of values", and
therefore "no one is really pleased very much, since they never get
exactly what they want, but then no one is really offended enough to
take action against" the NPS. The appeal for the management agency,
states Shreyer, is that it is politically safe; no one is really
offended, and therefore "they will not likely try to challenge your
philosophies". LCD management maximizes the number of visitors who
benefit from a particular recreational resource but does not maximize
the benefits derived by individuals, and therefore cheats all visitors
of quality in their recreational experience. Furthermore, it reduces
diversity in experience because all areas managed under this strategy
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offer the same experience.
Because of broad statutory mandates and intense political
pressures, the National Park Service often seems to adopt the LCD
strategy. Policy statements, such as the Leopold Report, offer
direction but do not give the Service the strength it needs to withstand
objections to its biocentric management actions that come from special
interest groups. The argument is not the appropriateness of
anthropocentric activities, but whether they are appropriate within
national parks. Structured, convenience-oriented, resort-style
activities can easily be provided outside the parks. Such recreation
can best be provided by private enterprise, and therefore should be
provided outside the parks on private land. In the Yellowstone region
these types of activities can be (and are) provided by resorts located
outside the Park, such as Big Sky Resort, Chico Hot Springs, and Flagg
Ranch. Within the Park, biocentric activities in which the Park visitor
is allowed to engage in unstructured, contemplative forms of recreation
(as described by Sax) should be encouraged, leaving the visitor free
from constraints presented by concessioners and large, resort-style
facilities. This type of recreation is most likely to be in line with
preservation of park values and resources. The parks should provide an
experience unique from that provided by private resorts, other federal
lands, and state and county parks. They must be viewed as part of a
diverse system of recreational lands, and must be expected to provide
quality experiences for a portion of recreationists, rather than trying
to meet all recreational demands. The parks simply cannot be all things
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to all people, and therefore as Sax advocated, the experience provided
within the parks must be "unbundled" from that provided outside the
parks. For this to happen, the parks need more legal protection and
direction from Congress.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbey, Edward. 1968. Desert solitaire: A season in the
wilderness. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Anderson, Jack K. former Yellowstone Park Superintendent.
personal communication, telephone interview, 26 Apr 1984.
Anzelmo, Joan. Public Relations Director, NPS, Yellowstone,
personal communication, interview at Mammoth, WY, 28 Jul 1983.
Barbee, Robert. Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park.
personal communication, interview at Mammoth, WY, 15 Sep 1983.
Bartlett, R.A. 1983. The concessionaires of Yellowstone National
Park: Genesis of a policy 1882-1892. Pacific Northwest
Quarterly 74(1):2-10.
Billings Gazette. 1972. Business wants say in park master plan.
Billings, MT 16 Mar 1972.
Bozeman Chronicle. 1982. Park roads open. Bozeman, MT 2 Apr
1982.
Brooks, Paul. 1961. Our national parks in jeopardy: The pressure
of numbers. Atlantic Monthly 207(2):54-56.
Buchholtz, C.W. 1969. The historical dichotomy of use and
preservation in Glacier National Park, unpublished master's
thesis, University of Montana.
Butcher, Devereux. 1961. Our national parks in jeopardy: Resorts
or wilderness? Atlantic Monthly 207(2):45-51.
Catlin, George. 1832. An artist proposes a national park, in The
American environment: readings in the history of conservation.
Roderick Nash, ed. Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley, 1968.
Chubb, Michael and Holly R. Chubb. 1981. One third of our time?
An introduction to recreation behavior and resources. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Conservation Foundation. 1972. National parks for the future: An
appraisal of the national parks as they begin their second
century in a changing America. Washington: The Conservation
Foundation.
Craig, James B. 1957. The battle of the wilderness. American
Forests 63(8):12-15, 46-50.

Page

Darling, F. Fraser and Noel D. Eichhorn. 1969. Man and Nature
in the national parks. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: The
Conservation Foundation.
DeVoto, Bernard. 1953. Let's close the national parks. Harper's
Magazine 207(1241):49-52.
Drury, Newton B. 1949. The dilemma of our parks. American
Forests 55(6):6-ll.
Edlund, Curt, formerly in concessions management division of NPS
in Yellowstone, personal communication, interview at Mammoth,
WY, 1 Sep 1983.
Everhart, William C. 1972. The National Park Service. New York:
Praeger Publishers.
Flynn, Thomas. 1964. memorandum to Yellowstone Superintendent
John McLaughlin, dated 6 Apr 1964. located in Yellowstone Park
Library (with 1963 Wilson concessionaire study).
Frome, Michael. 1981. Park concessions and concessioners.
National Parks and Conservation Magazine 55(6):16-18.
Garrison, Lemuel A. 1983. The making of a ranger: Forty years
with the national parks. Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers.
Garrison, Lemuel A. (Lon). 1980. The Mather-Albright years. Big
Bend National Park, TX: Big Bend National History Association,
Inc.
Garrison, Lemuel A. 1973. interview with A1 Mebane 22 Feb 1973,
as transcribed by Cheryl Moore, Feb 1977. located in the
Yellowstone Park Library.
Garrison, Lemuel A. 1964. Managing human use of parks, in Issues
In Outdoor Recreation. 2nd ed. Clayne R. Jensen and Clark T.
Thorstenson, eds. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company.
Garrison, Lemuel A. former Yellowstone Park Superintendent,
personal communication, telephone interview, 27 Sep 1982.
Gilbert, Douglas L. 1971. Natural resources and public relations.
2nd ed. Washington: The Wildlife Society.
Haines, Aubrey L. 1977. The Yellowstone story (2 vols).
Yellowstone Library and Museum Association in cooperation with
Colorado Associated University Press.
Haines, Aubrey L. former Yellowstone Park Historian, personal
communication, interview at Bozeman, MT, 11 Apr 1983.

Page

Haines, Aubrey L. written correspondence to author in response to
author's letter, dated 25 Apr 1984.
Hampton, H.D. 1971. How the U.S. cavalry saved our national
parks. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science
162(3859):1243-1248.
Hartzog, George, (undated), memorandum to members of the
Yellowstone Park Master Plan study team, stamped 4 Apr 1967.
located in the Yellowstone Park Library (in folder entitled "New
Master Plan Feb. 1970").
Hendee, John C. and George H. Stankey. 1973. Biocentricity in
wilderness management. Bioscience 23(9):535-538.
Hendee, John C., George H. Stankey and Robert C. Lucas. 1978.
Wilderness management. USDA Forest Service miscellaneous
publication No. 1365.
Hill, Gladwin. 1972. Pristine preserves or popcorn playgrounds?
Saturday Review 1 Jan 72:40-41, 56-57.
Huser, Verne. 1972. Yellowstone National Park: Use, overuse, and
misuse. National Parks and Conservation Magazine 46(3):8-17.
Huth, Hans. 1957. Nature and the American: Three centuries of
changing attitudes. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ise, John. 1961. Our national park policy: A critical history.
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
King, John. Chief Engineer, TWA Services, Yellowstone, personal
communication, telephone interview, 8 Apr 1984.
Krutch, Joseph Wood. 1957. Which men? Which needs? American
Forests 63(4):20-23, 44-46.

Page

Langford, Nathaniel Pitt. 1905. The discovery of Yellowstone
Park. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Lee, Ronald F. 1974. Family tree of the National Park System.
Philadelphia: Eastern National Park and Monument Association.
Leopold, A. Starker, Stanley A. Cain, Clarence M. Cottam, Ira N.
Gabriel son and Thomas L. Kimball. 1963. Wildlife management
in the national parks, in Readings in wildlife conservation,
James A. Bailey, William Elder, and Ted D. McKinney, eds.
Washington, D.C.: The Wildlife Society, 1974.
Mantel!, Michael. 1979. Preservation and use: Concessions in the
national parks. Ecology Law Quarterly 8(1):1-54.
McCool, Stephen F. 1983. The national parks in post-industrial
America. Western Wildlands 9(2):14-19.
McNamee, Tom. 1982. Breath-holding in grizzly country. Audubon
Magazine 84(6):68-83.
Merriam, Lawrence C., Jr. 1972. The National Park System: growth
and outlook. National Parks and Conservation Magazine 46(12):
4-12.
Nakamura, Robert T. and Frank Smallwood. 1980. The politics of
policy implementation. New York: John Hopkins Press.
Nash, Roderick. 1973. Wilderness and the American mind. 2nd ed.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Nash, Roderick. 1982. Wilderness and the American mind. 3rd ed.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
National Park System Advisory Board, (undated). Grant Village
Development (booklet 1). located in the Yellowstone Park
Library.
National Park System Advisory Board, (undated). Grant Village
Development (booklet 2). located in the Yellowstone Park
Library.
Netboy, Anthony. 1955. Crisis in our parks. American Forests
61(5):24-27, 46-47.

Page

Ogden, Daniel, Jr. 1971. How national policy is made, excerpt of
one of a series of lectures on "the political economy of the
preservation and development of outdoor recreational resources"
delivered by Ogden at the University of California-Berkeley in
Feb 1971, under the auspices of the Herman Royer Program in
Political Economy.
Runte, Alfred. 1974. Pragmatic alliance: Western railroads and
the national parks. National Parks and Conservation Magazine
48(4):14-21.
Runte, Alfred. 1979. National parks: The American experience.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Sax, Joseph L. 1976. America's national parks: Their principles,
purposes, and prospects. Natural History 85(8):57-88.
Sax, Joseph L. 1980. Mountains without handrails. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Shankland, Robert. 1970. Steve Mather of the national parks,
revised and enlarged ed. New York: Knopf.
Smith, Frank E. 1966. The politics of conservation. New York:
Pantheon Books, div. of Random House.
Shreyer, Richard. 1979. Principles of recreational carrying
capacity, in Proceeding of the Specialty Conference of the
First Annual Conference on Recreation Planning and Development,
(vol. 1). New York: American Society of Civil Engineers, pp.
261-269.
Shreyer, Richard. 1976. Sociological and political factors in
carrying capacity decision making, in Proceedings. Third
Resources Management Conference, Southwest Region. Santa Fe,
NM: National Park Service, pp 221-255.
Sullivan, John. 1972. Melcher says park run down, overrun.
Livingston (MT) Enterprise (no date) Jan 1972. located in
Yellowstone Park Library.
Toffler, Alvin. 1980. The third wave. New York: Morrow.
Udall, Stewart L. 1963. The quiet crisis. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.

Page

Udall, Stewart L. 1972. How to save the national parks: Ration
people. New York Times, 27 Feb 1972.
USDI information service, National Park Service, press release
dated 24 Jun 1956. located in the Yellowstone Park Archives
(Mission 66, box 2).
USDI, National Park Service. 1956. Mission 66 for the National
Park System, located in the Yellowstone Park Library.
USDI, National Park Service. 1956. Mission 66 for Yellowstone
National Park, located in the Yellowstone Park Archives.
USDI, National Park Service. 1974. Yellowstone National Park
Master Plan.
USDI, National Park Service. 1979. Environmental assessment for
the development concept plan for Grant Village, Yellowstone
National Park. Denver Service Center, June 1979. (reprinted
March 1981).
USDI, National Park Service. 1983. National park statistical
abstract 1982.
USDI, National Park Service. 1984. Old Faithful draft development
concept plan. Denver Service Center, Feb. 1984.
Utley, Robert. 1974. Toward a new preservation ethic. NPS
Newsletter 9(18):7.
Vetter, Ernest G. 1957. Project in the parks. American Forests
63(9):16-18, 40-43.
Wenk, Daniel. NPS Landscape Architect, Yellowstone, personal
communication, interview at Mammoth, WY, 1 Sep 1983, and
telephone interview 27 Apr 1984.
Wilson, Merrill Ann. 1976. Rustic architecture: The national
park style. Trends July-Sept. 1976:4-7.
Wilson, Ralph D. 1963. letter to Yellowstone Superintendent
Garrison dated 11 Oct 1963. located in Yellowstone Park Library
(in Wilson concessionaire study).
Wilson, Ralph D. 1964. Supplementary report: Management study of
the concessionaire operations, Yellowstone Park Company 1963.
located in Yellowstone Park Library (Wilson concessioner study).
Wirth, Conrad L. 1955. memorandum to Washington office and all
field offices, dated 18 Feb 1955. located in Yellowstone Park
Archives (Mission 66, box 2).

Page

Wirth, Conrad L. 1980. Parks, politics, and the people. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press.
Wynkoop, Steve. 1972. U.S. park development plan thrown in
reverse. The Denver Post 12 Mar 1972.
Yellowstone Park Master Plan. 1953. Development outline,
Yellowstone National Park, West Thumb, located in Yellowstone
Park Library (in folder entitled "Master Plans 1950s").

